Oops. So, A&A did talk about a definition of the cognitive

Doing a word search over Bounds I found the following:

One way to think about our strategy for demarcating cognitive from non-cognitive processes is to begin with paradigms of cognitive processing, those involving normal humans.  We have been drawing on features of human cognition as a first step towards demarcating the cognitive from the non-cognitive.  But, surely the category of the cognitive encompasses more than this.  Surely a definition of the cognitive exclusively in terms of normal human cognition is too parochial. (Bounds, p. 70).

It would have been better to write "account" rather than "definition" in that last sentence.

So, against this.  There is no use of "definition" in Adams and Aizawa, (2001), and the following disclaimers in Bounds.

In Chapters 3 and 4, we develop and defend in more detail our positive approach to the mark of the cognitive, namely, that cognitive processes differ from non-cognitive processes in terms of the kinds of mechanisms that operate on non-derived representations.  We offer this as part of a theory of the cognitive, rather than as (part of) a definition of the term “cognitive.”  We do not mean to stipulate that this is just what we mean by “cognition.”   (Adams & Aizawa, 2008, pp. 12-13) 

Here we think it is perfectly reasonable for us to stand by the view that these Martian representational states are not cognitive states.  We have a theory of what cognition involves.  The Martians in Clark’s thought experiment do not satisfy the conditions of that theory.  So we must either reject the hypothesis that the Martians have cognitive processing or the hypothesis that cognition involves non-derived representations.  Why can we not rationally choose to stand by our theory?  Our theory is an empirical conjecture about the nature of cognition, not a definition of cognition.  Thus, future scientific developments could undermine our theory and force revisions.  Or, our theory could turn out to be so successful and well-confirmed that we determine that Martians are not cognizers. (Adams & Aizawa, 2008, p. 49)

In this chapter we have offered an empirical hypothesis concerning what all cognitive processes have in common, namely, that they all involve non-derived representations.  We do not take this to be part of a definition of the cognitive.  Nor do we mean to stipulate what we shall mean by the word “cognitive.”  (Adams & Aizawa, 2008, p. 55)

Evidently, the dispute must be joined by a substantive theory of the cognitive.  This is why we offer the conjecture that cognitive processes involve non-derived representations that are embedded within (largely unknown) cognitive mechanisms.  This is not a definition of the cognitive, let alone a stipulative definition of the cognitive.  It is a theory that we think is implicitly at work in a lot of cognitive psychological research.  (Adams & Aizawa, 2008, p. 84)

So, there is a little infelicity.

The Hypothesis of Extended Active Maintenance Cognition

In Radical Embodied Cognitive Science, Chemero writes "I take it that cognition is the ongoing, active maintenance of a robust animal-environment system, achieved by closely co-ordinated perception and action." (fn #8, p. 212).

This, of course, allows us to frame what we might call the hypothesis of extended active maintenance cognition
(HEAMC):  Active maintenance cognition (sometimes?) extends beyond the boundaries of the brain into the body and physical world.

Now, we have something to talk about.  We can begin to explore, for example, what relation there might be between (HEFC), (HESC), and (HEAMC).

The Hypothesis of Extended Folk Cognition

In Supersizing the Mind, (p. 88), Clark suggests that he thinks that it is a kind of "commonsense functionalism" that is supposed to extend.  So, we might draw a distinction between a view (HEFC) which maintains that folk cognition extends from the brain into the body and world and a view (HESC) which maintains that scientific cognition extends from the brain into the body and world.

Then, one might say that it’s fine if there is extended folk cognition.  That leaves cognitive psychology free to continue as before, studying intracranial cognition. Why should scientific cognitive psychology care any more about folk cognition than physicists care about folk physics?

Author Meets Critics on Rupert's "Extended Cognition and the Extended Mind"

102nd Meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology

April 15-17, 2010

Westin Peachtree

Atlanta, GA

Saturday Afternoon                  International D
2:30 p.m. - 4:45 p.m.           
PHILOSOPHY SESSION XIX

Book Symposium on Rob Rupert’s Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind

Chair: Kristofer Rhodes, University of California, Irvine

2:30    Colin Klein, University of Illinois, Chicago
Integration, Invariance, and Rupert's System-Based Approach to Demarcation
   
    Commentator: Rob Rupert, University of Colorado

3:30    Ken Aizawa, Centenary College of Louisiana
    Rupert’s Extended Cognition
   
    Commentator: Rob Rupert, University of Colorado

Does Cognitivism Beg the EC Question? II

It is, of course, true that many advocates of extended cognition reject cognitivism.  See, for example, Haugeland (1999), Thompson (2007), Wallace (2007), and Gomila and Calvo (2008).  Yet, the fact that there is this disagreement does not mean that an appeal to cognitivism in making a case against extended cognition begs the question against extended cognition.  One begs the question when one assumes, without argument, what one is trying to prove.  But, cognitivism isn’t assumed without argument in Bounds.  The case for cognitivism lies in its success in explaining various features of cognition.   Were the mere existence of different views of P sufficient to guarantee that one side or the other is begging the question, then every debate would have to involve begging the question.

Is Rupert Doing Conceptual Analysis?

In his recent NDPR review of Rupert's Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind, Wilson rejects the search for a "mark of the cognitive" roughly on the grounds that it is a bit of conceptual analysis, hence that the search a dubious enterprise.  (Wilson's text below the fold.)

But, when Rupert cites such things as the "generation effect" in order to argue that Otto's notebook does not constitute memory, it does not look like Rupert is doing conceptual analysis.  That normal human memory displays a generation effect is an empirical discovery.

There is no "mark of the cognitive"

So says Chemero.  Radical Embodied Cognitive Science, fn#8, p. 212.  But, what, more precisely, does this rejection amount to?

Does it mean that there is no difference between cognitive processes and non-cognitive processes?

Or does it merely mean that the difference cannot be defined?
Or does it merely mean that the difference cannot be spelled out in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions?
Or does it mean that there is no theory of the difference at all?
Or does it mean that we have no theory of the difference at this time?
Or what?

Minds and Machines Review of Noë's Out of Our Heads

Andreas Elpidorou's review is here.

Minds and Machines Review of Clark's Supersizing

David Cole's review here.

Is giving a "Mark of the Cognitive" supposed to be defining "cognition"

In fn #8, p. 212, of Radical Embodied Cognitive Science, Chemero writes,
"Adams and Aizawa (2008) argue that defenders of the sort of view of cognition that I am defending here need to give a definition of 'cognition'".

I don't think A&A ever mention a need to define "cognition" and at one point we were pretty explicit about not defining "cognition" ourselves.  (See below the fold.)  For A&A, giving a "mark of the cognitive" is not meant to be defining "cognition".

In fact, if one reads through the remainder of Chemero's footnote, one finds Chemero using something like the meta-theory A&A use to specify how they distinguish cognitive processes from non-cognitive processes.