A TSRM Snippett

The second stage in analyzing an affordance for an animal is very much a matter (for visually detected affordances) of mathematical optics: to describe the light patterned by an affordance-specific occurrent property and to characterize that patterning in terms of an optical variable, an optical property, that stands in strict correspondence to the occurrent property. (TSRM, 1981, p. 265).

So, in comments on an earlier post, Andrew asked about where it is that TSRM talk about anchoring properties structuring light. It is in section 5. "The specification of intension: affordances and ecological laws", pp. 260-7.  It is rough sledding.

Is this Walk-on-able? 2

Does the glass floor structure light in such a way as to enable a human to visually perceive stand-on-ability?

Charles wondered, at one point, whether my exploding box example was just some philosophical exotica, like imagining a wizard, but as I said earlier, the point is completely pedestrian.  The basic point can be transferred to plenty of other examples.

I guess it's unfortunate that the EPists have been too busy to test one of the fundamental assumptions of Gibson's theory, namely, whether the composition and layout of surfaces constitute affordances, or the TSRM assumption that anchoring properties structure light.

Kiverstein & Farina on Fine-grained Functionalism

Opponents of EMT have repeatedly argued that the functional roles that define a mental state must be understood in a fine-grained way ...

Actually, this coarse-grained/fine-grained stuff is an innovation from the EC side of things.  It's a distinction that ECists have introduced (but left in intuitive terms) to fend off the observations (which seem to be universally accepted*) that there are differences between Inga and Otto that brain-o-centric cognitive psychologists have cared about.  (Indeed, Inga and Otto don't even behave the same way.  Otto will "remember" much more reliably than will Inga.  As the story is typically told, his memories do not fade over time.)

That aside, my sense is that some history of these arguments has been lost.  Ten+ years ago, one often encountered the claim that there is no principled reason for thinking that cognitive processes take place in the brain.  But, if one can understand cognitive processes as cognitive psychologists do (as what Clark, Kiverstein, Farina, et al., describe as"fine-grained"), then there is some principled reason to think that cognitive processes take place in the brain.  So, A&A don't say that functional roles, or the individuation of cognitive states, must be fine-grained.  Only that the states brain-o-centric cognitive psychologists study are such-and-so (which Clark, Kiverstein, Farina, et al.will describe as fine-grained).  That's why they are principled, brain-o-centric cognitive psychologists.

Or, think of it this way.  We can draw a distinction between an hypothesis of fine-grained cognition and a hypothesis of coarse-grained cognition.  The first, by all accounts, would seem not to be extended, where the latter might be.  But, that's fine by me.  The old-fashioned cognitive psychology that studies brain processes could go on as before.

Kiverstein & Farina's and the Modal Version of Extended Cognition

NB: The posts on this paper that will follow in the coming days are all based on this late draft of the Kiverstein & Farina paper.  I've sent them these comments, so the final publication may or may not be different.  And, since Julian and Mirko read the blog (at least at times), they might appreciate some feedback.  Pile on or rise to their defense!

We will call the more general thesis that mental states can supervene on organised systems of processes and mechanisms that criss-cross the boundary of brain, body and world, the Extended Mind Thesis (EMT).  EMT would seem to be a thesis that any philosopher of mind committed to functionalism ought to sign up for.  For it looks to be a straightforward implication of the central tenet of functionalism that it is a state of mind’s causal role that makes it the type of state that it is. The biological and the artefactual can coalesce to realise a type of mental state, so long as they work together to make the right kinds of causal contribution in the initiation and guidance of successful purposeful behaviour.  Where the materials that make this causal contribution are located is not relevant, what is important is simply the job that these materials perform.  Often these jobs can be performed better when the biological agent works in partnership with resources located in the environment beyond the boundary of skin and skull.  (Kiverstein & Farina, forthcoming, p. 2)

Now, Rupert and A&A agree with EMT formulated this way: "mental states can supervene on organised systems of processes and mechanisms that criss-cross the boundary of brain, body and world, the Extended Mind Thesis (EMT). " (italics added).  This is a modal claim, which is to be distinguished from the non-modal claim that mental states supervene on organised systems of processes and mechanisms that criss-cross the boundary of brain, body and world.  Mike Wheeler has made this distinction pretty prominent in the manuscript for his current book. 

Is this Walk-on-able? 1

Does the surface of this pond structure light in such a way as to enable a human to visually perceive that this is walk-on-able?

From Blomberg's Review of Rowlands' New Science

    To sum up, The New Science of the Mind is in my view an uneven book. The first part is a brief and useful introduction to the philosophy of embodied, extended and enactive cognition. The second part is an excellent analysis of counterarguments to the embodied and extended mind (and their combination in the amalgamated mind), and an interesting response to these arguments via a plausible criterion of what counts as a cognitive process. As far as I know, critics of the extended mind (such as Fred Adams, Kenneth Aizawa or Robert Rupert) have not responded to Rowlands criterion (first presented in Rowlands 2009). It would be interesting to see what they make of it.

I have written a reply to Rowlands, (2009), on this.  It is in Aizawa, K. (2010).  "The Coupling-Constitution Fallacy Revisited,  (2010), Cognitive Systems Research, 11, (4), 332-342

And, actually, Mark and I talked about this in our discussion on Philosophy TV.

Is this edible? 4

Do the surfaces here structure light in such as way as to specify whether this is edible for humans?

Job: Teaching Fellow in Mind and Embodied Cognition

Department of Philosophy
University of Edinburgh

Applications are invited for a full-time 2-year fixed-term Teaching Fellowship in the area of Mind and Embodied Cognition.

This post has been created to support teaching and graduate supervision during a period of research leave granted to Professor Andy Clark. The successful candidate will have a PhD and publications commensurate with their stage in career. She or he will deliver philosophical and interdisciplinary teaching (including helping with graduate supervision) in the areas of Embodied Cognition and Philosophy of Mind. The successful candidate will also contribute teaching to the masters level specialization in Mind, Language and Embodied Cognition.

Teaching skills in the area of consciousness studies and/or philosophy of perception would be considered an advantage.

The position is available from 1 April 2011 for a period of 24 months.
For more information, go to: http://www.jobs.ed.ac.uk/ and enter the reference number 3014036

Still Another Note on Merritt's Abstract

As a final component to the paper, I argue that although this more liberal account of extended cognition dispenses with the need to preserve non-derived content as the sole marker of „the mind,‟

Just to be clear, it's not the A&A view that bearing non-derived content is the sole marker of the "the mind" or cognition.  There is that stuff about how representations bearing non-derived content are manipulated.

Is this edible? 3

Do the surfaces of these pellets really structure light in such a way as to specify whether they are edible for humans?