WSJ: When You’re Evil, the Whole World Looks Dark

More of the world reflecting your mind.

Workshop on Embodied, Distributed, and Extended Cognition: UAB

Further info here.

Congratulations to Michael Anderson on his CASBS Fellowship!

Details here .

Philosophical Psychology: "Contingent transcranialism and deep functional cognitive integration"

A new article by Jennifer Greenwood forthcoming here.

Abstract

Contingent transcranialists claim that the physical mechanisms of mind are not exclusively intracranial and that genuine cognitive systems can extend into cognizers' physical and socio-cultural environments. They further claim that extended cognitive systems must include the deep functional integration of external environmental resources with internal neural resources. They have found it difficult, however, to explicate the precise nature of such deep functional integration and provide compelling examples of it. Contingent intracranialists deny that extracranial resources can be components of genuine extended cognitive systems. They claim that transcranialists fallaciously conflate coupling with constitution and construe cognition as extending always from brains into world rather than world into brains. By using insights from recent research in developmental psychology and by explicating the nature of one form that deep functional integration can take, I argue that (i) transcranialists do not fallaciously conflate coupling wth constitution, and (ii) human emotional ontogenesis is a world-to-brain transcranial achievement.

I don't have the article yet, but I'm going to speculate that by "contingent intracranialists" Greenwood includes Adams and Aizawa.  But, if so, we do not deny that extracranial resources can be components of genuine extended cognitive systems.  We think that extracranial resources can be component of genuine extended cognitive systems, it's just that they are not.  Here is the abstract to Adams and Aizawa, 2001:

Recent work in cognitive science has suggested that there are actual cases in which cognitive processes extend in the physical world beyond the bounds of the brain and the body. We argue that, while transcranial cognition may be both a logical and a nomological possibility, no case has been made for its current existence. In other words, we defend a form of contingent intracranialism
about the cognitive.

Embodied Cognition at NRP: Thinking Outside The Box, With Our Bodies And Our Brains

Link.

The Implications of Embodiment: Heidelberg University

Info here.

Open Positions at Ruhr University Bochum

I'm going to spend a couple of months at RUB this summer, along with (at overlapping times) Colin Allen, Cameron Buckner, and Nivedita Gangopadhyay, among others.  I'm very much looking forward to it, so perhaps others would be interested as well.

Info here.

Sprevak at the State University of Milan

COGNITION IN ACTION LECTURE SERIES (2012)
Department of Philosophy, State University of Milan


How does the situated cognition program justify the extended mind?

Mark Sprevak (University of Edinburgh)

Thursday, 8th March 2012
4.30pm - 6.30pm
Room 435


More info: http://neurophilosophy.unimi.it/index.php/events/icalrepeat.detail/20...

EC over at "The Frailest Thing"

Here.

Ulatowski's Review of Menary's Extended Mind

Here at Metapsychology.

Thanks to Leslie Marsh for bringing my attention to it.  We seem to be fishing up many of the same things these days.