Second, suppose that you are playing a visual problem-solving game, such as Rush Hour, or completing a jigsaw puzzle. (Rush Hour involves a square board loaded with cars and trucks in various positions," and the object is to move these in a sequence so as to allow a designated car to leave the board through the only exit.) Here the problem solving in part consists of internal mental operations (let us suppose), but also in part it consists of the active physical manipulation of pieces on a board or pieces within the puzzle. One might suppose that these manipulations-rotations of puzzle pieces, or trials of car move sequences-were simply presented to you in a computer simulation, or through an automation of trial moves from which you select the best outcome. I suspect that this would change the problem-solving task in a significant way; but note that even here problem solving requires active engagement with a part of the world beyond the head, namely, the various visual displays from which one must select. In both cases, the problems are solved by utilizing, exploiting, or manipulating a set of resources, some of which are outside of the head. These are not simply inputs to those that are inside the head, because the very process of problem solving involves them as much as it involves resources inside the head. There is nothing bounded by the skull that counts as solving these kind of problems. (Wilson, 2010, pp. 180-181).
This might be clearer by an analogy. Suppose you have to solve the problem of printing the numerals for the first one hundred prime numbers on a sheet of paper. Also suppose that you have a computer with a program that computes these numerals and sends them to the printer. All you have to do is hit the "return" key. Now, I'm ok with saying that the problem solving involves the stuff that the computer and printer do, but why go further with Wilson and say that the cognitive contribution also includes the stuff the computer and printer do? That is, why accept EC? What's wrong with the view that the cognitive processing dedicated to solving the problem ends with your hitting the return key? That is, what is wrong with the anti-EC interpretation?
"Now, I'm ok with saying that the problem solving involves the stuff that the computer and printer do, but why go further with Wilson and say that the cognitive contribution also includes the stuff the computer and printer do? That is, why accept EC?"
ReplyDeleteLet's extend your analogy. Say Jones needs to memorize all the prime numbers 1-100 for a memory contest. Printing the numbers out and seeing them before him reduces the difficulty of the task of memorization. We can thus say that printing the numbers becomes part of the total functional loop which enables the optimization of his learning task.
When Jones was faced with the steep task of memorizing all the prime numbers 1-100, he utilized a tool to reduce the cognitive complexity of the task. After printing, he might have even used a pencil or highlighter to separate the numbers into separate "chunks", further reducing the complexity of the task.
I see no a priori reason reason why your example spells disaster for the EC thesis. In order to fully examine the example, we need to look at the task of using computers within the larger context of goal-directed behavior. Mark Okrent has recently argued that goal-directed behavior is "strongly holistic" because it is only intelligible within the context of nested sets of purposeful behaviors. To see how the mind extends into the computers that surround us, we need to look at any particular task within the total context of how computers aid us in achieving tasks we could not perform otherwise.
I think Heidegger was right to point out the interconnectedness of equipment. He famously said there is no such thing as "a tool", but rather, a web of tools. The pencil is related to the paper, eraser, desk, lamp, room, house, etc. The hammer is related to nails, wood, building, construction, etc. Accordingly, your example is not a reductio for extended cognition. Just because it is counter-intuitive doesn't mean it is philosophically wrong.
This might seem like "cognitive bloat". But I think a thorough study of modern human cognition will reveal that, thanks to the rapid infiltration of computers into everyday life, the human mind actually *is* rather bloated. But not to the point of absurdity. There is a finite amount of extension. It just happens that we are a technologically advanced species, a rarity in the universe it seems. As Andy Clark says, "We self-engineer ourselves to think and perform better in the worlds we find ourselves in."
"I see no a priori reason reason why your example spells disaster for the EC thesis."
ReplyDeleteOk. Quick basic point. Wilson has offered an example that he thinks supports EC. I am replying to this argument, noting that the evidence is open to two interpretations. So, my point is that his argument is inconclusive. This is much like in science what data is open to more than one interpretation.
So, I'm not trying to offer a reason (a priori or otherwise) that is meant to spell disaster for EC. Instead, I'm trying to show that one argument for EC does not work.
So do you think the situation in the literature is that of two competing research paradigms? The 4E people do science and interpret data in one way, and the orthodox cognitivists do science and interpret data in another. The 4E people could then follow Michael Anderson's approach when he starts off a paper by saying:
ReplyDelete"Although it is customary in a talk on embodied cognition to begin with all the reasons we should doubt the more traditional approaches to the study of the mind, I am going to ignore that custom for both merely practical and more substantive reasons. The merely practical reason is the time allotted; the more substantive reason is the fact that we ought by now to be in a position where the embodied, situated and distributed approach(es) to the study of the mind are seen not primarily as criticisms of the prevailing paradigm, but as established, vibrant and fruitful research programs in their own right, needing no justification other than their own success."
"Let's extend your analogy. Say Jones needs to memorize all the prime numbers 1-100 for a memory contest. Printing the numbers out and seeing them before him reduces the difficulty of the task of memorization. We can thus say that printing the numbers becomes part of the total functional loop which enables the optimization of his learning task."
ReplyDeleteI have no objection to the idea that printing the numbers becomes part of the total functional loop which enables the optimization of his learning task. What I am resisting is Wilson's argument for extended cognition.
What I am resisting is extended cognition, not extended functional enabling loops. What I am resisting is extended cognition, not extended behavior.
"I think Heidegger was right to point out the interconnectedness of equipment. ... The pencil is related to the paper, eraser, desk, lamp, room, house, etc. The hammer is related to nails, wood, building, construction, etc."
ReplyDeleteWhy would I want to deny this interconnectedness of equipment? It seems to me a pretty superficial observation that doesn't have anything directly to do with HEC. I don't get it.
And I don't see how to get "there is no such thing as "a tool"" out of that. Why can't there be a tool in a web of tools? I don't think I have the kind of philosophical background that makes this seem to be a conclusion to draw from the foregoing, much less a momentous conclusion.
"I think Heidegger was right to point out the interconnectedness of equipment. He famously said there is no such thing as "a tool", but rather, a web of tools. The pencil is related to the paper, eraser, desk, lamp, room, house, etc. The hammer is related to nails, wood, building, construction, etc. Accordingly, your example is not a reductio for extended cognition. Just because it is counter-intuitive doesn't mean it is philosophically wrong."
ReplyDeleteAgain, I don't take my example to be a reductio of EC. Nor do I object that this is counter-intuitive. My point regarding Rush Hour is that this example is open to two interpretations, the EC interpretation and the non-EC interpretation.
But, to get back to the web of tools idea, what *I* think separates me from Wilson is how we propose to understand the "web of tools". To a first approximation, Wilson seems to think that we should analyze the web as realizing some theory of cognitive processes, where A&A think that we should not. The debate I think we are having is not over the existence of a web of tools.