Monday, October 11, 2010
Two-way Brain-World Interaction
The host, Alan Saunders, prompts some discussion of the interactions between brain and world. Now, it seems to me that when Menary takes up this idea of this two-way symmetrical interaction between brain and world this can only be a description of a two-way symmetrical causal interaction between the brain and the world. But, while this sort of relation certainly exists and the EM folks often draw attention to this, the EM folks also want to say something other than just this. (That is, they want more than HEMC, they want HEC.) The EM folks want to say that, say, the iPhone or notebook is something like part of the realization base for someone's mental processes. But, realization is often taken to be a one-way lower- to higher-level determination relation. Or, maybe the EM folks want to say that the iPhone or notebook is something like the supervenience base for a person's mental states. This, too, however, is not a two-way brain-world interaction. It is something like a one-way lower- to higher-level determination relation.
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Hi Ken,
ReplyDeleteI don't think that 'brain-world interaction' is an accurate reflection of the discussion. Here from the transcript:
Alan Saunders: Well it's easy to see how our cognitive processes can by means of our bodies, affect the environment, but what you're arguing for is a two-way process.
Richard Menary: That's correct. So rather than thinking this is asymmetrical, a one-way relationship, it's a symmetrical relationship. It's a two-way relationship. So the world has to be doing some of the work.
So I don't say that there is a brain-world interaction. The claim is simply the standard active externalist one from the '98 paper, the body and world are doing some of the cognitive work and cognitive processes are (in these cases) loops through brain, body and local environment.
That's not the same claim as the one about the supervenience of mental states on a non-neural subvenient base. I think Andy has recently developed that idea quite a bit more than he had in the '98 paper, where I'm not sure supervenience is explicitly mentioned. Although you could argue that it is implicit in the Otto case.
Cheers,
Richard
Hi, Richard,
ReplyDeleteAfter a quick review of C&C, I think you are right about the C&C paper. (Readers might not the quote from the program ends with "some of the work".) In the C&C paper, there is the claim about causal interaction between brain and world and--instead of the realization or supervenience claim--the claim that brain-world process is cognitive.
So, I think I should have replaced:
"The EM folks want to say that, say, the iPhone or notebook is something like part of the realization base for someone's mental processes. But, realization is often taken to be a one-way lower- to higher-level determination relation. Or, maybe the EM folks want to say that the iPhone or notebook is something like the supervenience base for a person's mental states. This, too, however, is not a two-way brain-world interaction. It is something like a one-way lower- to higher-level determination relation. "
with something like
"The EM folks want to say that the whole brain-body-world process of using the notebook or iPhone *is* a cognitive process."
So, there is still a kind of causation-constitution to be drawn, only the technical term is not realization, constitution, or supervenience, it is identity.