Shapiro Gets it Wrong

On the dustcover to The Bounds of Cognition, Larry writes,

"Adams and Aizawa have written a book that is going to leave more than a few researchers in the burgeoning field of embodied cognition scratching their heads and wondering how they could have said those things."

He's wrong, because we've written a book that is leaving Sutton, Harris, Keil, and Barnier, bewildered (rather than scratching their heads) and saying they never said those things (rather than wondering how they could have said those things).

We are bewildered at the dialectic on which Adams and Aizawa here rely. We are entirely happy to treat the study of intracranial processes as scientifically valid, and to accept intracranial cognition: we have never argued otherwise, and nor to our knowledge has Clark (nor Rowlands, nor Wilson). Cognition is not necessarily or always extended (Wilson & Clark 2009, p.74; Sutton 2010, p.191; Rowlands 2010).

Now, I think it may well be true that Sutton never denied that there are intracranial cognitive processes and perhaps Rob Wilson never has as well.   I don't know of text in which they deny this.  On the other hand, many advocates of EC do deny this.  For quotations to this effect, check out my posts labeled "Revolutionary EC".  The revolutionary claim is that there is no intracranial cognition.

I'll be posting a few more references to this in the coming days.

I will also be indicating respects in which I think that Sutton, et al., misinterpret what A&A are up to, so readers might check out the four brief pages where A&A discuss complementarity in The Bounds of Cognition.  (They are pages 143-7).