Amsterdam Graduate Philosophy Conference: Internalism v. Externalism

16-17 December 2011

Department of Philosophy
Institute for Logic, Language and Computation
Universiteit van Amsterdam

The 4th Amsterdam Graduate Philosophy Conference on ‘Internalism versus Externalism’ is devoted to explore how this distinction relates to problems in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, epistemology, and philosophy of action.
Confirmed invited speakers:

• Martin Kusch (Vienna)
  
• Joëlle Proust (Paris)
  
• Michael Wheeler (Stirling)
  

Please visit the conference website at http://www.illc.uva.nl/agpc/agpc11/, or email agpc@uva.nl

MSc in Mind, Language & Embodied Cognition—University of Edinburgh

University of Edinburgh
The Mind and Cognition group at the University of Edinburgh invite applications for a taught MSc programme (commencing September 2012) in Mind, Language and Embodied Cognition. Students will tackle the key questions that are at the heart of the recent renaissance in the philosophical and scientific study of the embodied and environmentally embedded mind. The programme draws on teaching from across the university, but students will be based in the School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences. In addition to courses offered as a part of the programme students will have the opportunity to enrol on relevant courses in Psychology, Linguistics, Informatics, and beyond.

For more information about the MSc, including online application procedures, see: http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/phil_students/postgraduate/msc_in_mind_language_and_embodied_cognition.php
Funding opportunities for MSc students are available: http://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/phil_students/postgraduate/postgraduate_funding.php.
Informal enquiries may be sent to the program director, Mark Sprevak (mark.sprevak@ed.ac.uk)
Edinburgh provides a world-leading environment to study philosophy of mind and cognitive science. The Mind and Cognition group include as Core Faculty:

• Andy Clark, working on the philosophical foundations of cognitive science and mind as an embodied and situated phenomenon.
  
• Jesper Kallestrup works on mind and metaphysics, and provides a bridge to the Epistemology grouping led by Duncan Pritchard.
  
• Jane Suilin Lavelle joined the group in April 2011, and works on social cognition and theory of mind.
  
• Matthew Nudds, working on the philosophy of perception and action, with a special focus on auditory perception
  
• Mark Sprevak joined the group in January 2011, and works on metaphysical and epistemological issues in philosophy of mind and cognitive science.
  
• Tillmann Vierkant works on agency and the will and provides a bridge to the world-class Ethics grouping led by Mike Ridge.
  
• Dave Ward joined the group in August 2011, and works on philosophy of mind with a special focus on the role of perception and action in cognition.
  

In addition, there are a number of other members of faculty with interests in mind and cognition, including Matthew Chrisman, Pauline Phemister, Mike Ridge, and Duncan Pritchard. The group benefits hugely from regular contact with the nearby School of Informatics, Departments of Psychology, and Linguistics, and the Human Cognitive Neuroscience unit.
Regular seminars and reading groups include:

• The Philosophy, Psychology, and Informatics Research Group (otherwise known as the ‘PPIG’): http://www.ppls.ed.ac.uk/groups/ppig-philosophy-psychology-and-informatics-reading-group
  
• Philosophy, Psychology, and Linguistics Interdisciplinary Seminar Series: http://www.ppls.ed.ac.uk/groups/ppls-interdisciplinary-seminar-series
  
• The Mind, Agency, and Perception Research Group: http://www.ppls.ed.ac.uk/philosophy/groups/mind-agency-and-perception-research-group
  
• The Philosophy of Biology reading group: http://www.ppls.ed.ac.uk/philosophy/groups/philosophy-of-biology-reading-group
  
• EPiPHENy: Edinburgh Philosophy and Phenomenology reading group: http://www.ppls.ed.ac.uk/philosophy/groups/epipheny-edinburgh-philosophy-phenomenology-reading-group
  
• Seminars in the Humanities Embodied Values project on the Senses at IASH: http://www.iash.ed.ac.uk/Sawyer/Home.html, and the upcoming conference: http://www.iash.ed.ac.uk/Sawyer/Conference.html
  

For more information on Mind and Cognition in Edinburgh, see: http://www.ppls.ed.ac.uk/philosophy/groups/mind-cognition-edinburgh

Conference and CFP: Minds, Bodies, and Problems

Info at Pete Mandik's Brain Hammer.

The Extended Mind and WE-ness: How Far Can It Stretch Without Breaking?- William Rottschaefer

The Extended Mind and WE-ness: How Far Can It Stretch Without Breaking?- William Rottschaefer (Lewis & Clark College)

Date: November 18, 3:30am - 5:00pm
Location: J.R. Howard Hall
 
Advocates of cognitive extension argue that the human mind super-sizes itself by embodying itself in a body, embedding itself in an epistemic environment and uniting itself with both in extended cognitive agency.  Call this the 3E-ness thesis.  In this paper, I propose a strong version of 3E-ness, WE-ness: In some instances super-sizing results in the creation of a plural subject, a WE.  I outline the ontological lineaments of WE-ness, distinguishing it from other forms of situated cognition, and suggest a bio-cultural model of its origin based on a biological model of the emergence of multi-cellular life from single- celled life.  I then examine recent findings and theories in developmental psychology concerning we-intentionality and its features of normative and supra-personal intentionality.  Developmental psychologist Michael Tomasello has argued that we-intentionality has played a central role in the social/cultural achievements that distinguish humans from their primate cousins.  Drawing on these findings, I argue that we-intentionality and its consequences suggest WE-ness for their bases.  I then lay out an argument for the existence of WE-ness based on a bio-cultural account of its origin and maintenance, indicating how we-intentionality might play in a role in those processes.  Finally, I examine three major objections to the extended mind thesis that also raise problems for WE-ness.