Showing posts with label Gangopadhyay. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Gangopadhyay. Show all posts

Thursday, February 17, 2011

Nivedita Gangopadhyay: The extended mind: born to be wild? A lesson from action-understanding

Here.

Abstract

The extended mind hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers in Analysis 58(1):7–19, 1998; Clark 2008) is an influential hypothesis in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I argue that the extended mind hypothesis is born to be wild. It has undeniable and irrepressible tendencies of flouting grounding assumptions of the traditional information-processing paradigm. I present case-studies from social cognition which not only support the extended mind proposal but also bring out its inherent wildness. In particular, I focus on cases of action-understanding and discuss the role of embodied intentionality in the extended mind project. I discuss two theories of action-understanding for exploring the support for the extended mind hypothesis in embodied intersubjective interaction, namely, simulation theory and a non-simulationist perceptual account. I argue that, if the extended mind adopts a simulation theory of action-understanding, it rejects representationalism. If it adopts a non-simulationist perceptual account of action-understanding, it rejects the classical sandwich view of the mind. 
 
Keywords  Extended mind – Action-understanding – Simulation theory – Non-simulationist perceptual theory – Embodied intersubjectivity – Representationalism – Dynamical systems – Perception – Action – Social cognition

Sunday, November 21, 2010

Gangopadhyay Talk at Aarhus

Nivedita's "Experiential Blindness Revisited" paper came out this summer in Leslie Marsh's special issue of Cognitive Systems Research.  I read through a draft and I was just looking it over again yesterday.  It is a scientifically imposing reply to my "Understanding Embodied Perception" and Chapter 9 of The Bounds of Cognition.  I have it in my mind to write a reply to this, along with Rob Wilson's "Extended Vision" (to be found in Perception, Action, and Consciousness), but I don't see myself getting to that before next fall.

Invitation to a brown bag lunch discussion with:

Nivedita Gangopadhyay (Postdoc)
Center for Subjectivity Research
University of Copenhagen



"Experiential blindness revisited: In defence of a case of embodied cognition"


Date: Dec. 7 and 12:000
Location: GNOSIS Research Centre,  Aarhus University
Tuborgvej 164,
2400 Copenhagen, Denmark
Building C, room 016



Abstract
The sensorimotor theory (Noe¨,2004, in press) discusses a special instance of lack of perceptual experience despite no sensory impairment. The phenomenon dubbed  "experiential blindness” is cited as evidence for a constitutive relation between sensorimotor skills and  perceptual experience. Recently it has been objected (Adams&Aizawa, 2008; Aizawa, 2007)that the cases described by Noe¨ as experiential blindness are cases of pure sensory deficit. This paper argues that while the objections bring out limitations of Noe¨’s sensorimotor theory they do not do enough to challenge a robust perception–action interdependence claim. There are genuine cases of experiential  blindness and these are better explained by the hypothesis of the interdependence of perception and action rather than by a passive vision approach. The cases provide support for a strong thesis of embodied cognition where ongoing sensorimotor dynamics non-trivially constrain perceptual content.


Bring your own lunch. Coffee and cake will be provided.
See you then.


John Michael
Post-Doctoral Research Fellow
GNOSIS Research Centre,  Aarhus University
Tuborgvej 164,
2400 Copenhagen, Denmark
T: 0045 - 88 88 95 57
F: 0045 - 88 88 97 10


John Michael
Post-Doctoral Research Fellow
GNOSIS Research Centre,  Aarhus University
Tuborgvej 164,
2400 Copenhagen, Denmark
T: 0045 - 88 88 95 57
F: 0045 - 88 88 97 10

Wednesday, August 4, 2010

Gary Williams' "Minds and Brains" Blog

Williams, a grad student at LSU, has a very nice blog, "Minds and Brains," here.  I've found several of his posts interesting and informative, probably because he embraces much of the Heideggerian, Gibsonian, picture that I often find baffling.

We have been discussing Noë's enactivism here.  There are also links to a forthcoming paper of mine and another soon-to-exist link to a forthcoming paper by Nivedita Gangopadhya.