Do Rupert, A&A, Misunderstand the Parity Principle?

Menary writes,

These critics think that the main argument for the extended mind is simply the claim that if external processes are sufficiently similar to internal ones, then they are cognitive. Is this really the argument for EM? I believe that the critics have reached this conclusion by misinterpreting the PP.  (Menary, 2010, p. 6).

Clark has previously suggested that Rupert, Adams and Aizawa have been misinterpreting the Parity Principle, but I'm not really sure why he and Menary think this.  What have we written that leads them to think that the PP is the basis for our thinking that one argument for the extended mind is that external processes are sometimes sufficiently similar to internal ones?  Here is why I think that there is such an argument.  It comes from the Inga-Otto example (but also the three modes of Tetris play case.)  Note the following:

For in relevant respects the cases are entirely analogous: the notebook plays for Otto the same role that memory plays for Inga.  The information in the notebook functions just like the information constituting an ordinary non-occurrent belief; it just happens that this information lies beyond the skin (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 13).

Certainly, insofar as beliefs and desires are characterized by their explanatory roles, Otto’s and Inga’s cases seem to be on a par: the essential causal dynamics of the two cases mirror each other precisely (ibid.)

What C-C Fallacy 8

The external features in a coupled system play an ineliminable role—if we retain internal structure but change the external features, behavior may change completely.  The external features here are just as causally relevant as typical internal features of the brain.  (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 9)

Again, the emphasis is on causal connections.

What C-C Fallacy? 7

In the cases we describe, by contrast, the relevant external features are active, playing a crucial role in the here-and-now.  Because they are coupled with the human organism, they have a direct impact on the organism and on its behavior.  In these cases, the relevant parts of the world are in the loop, not dangling at the other end of a long causal chain.  Concentrating on this sort of coupling leads us to an active externalism (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 9)

Again, it looks like the existence of a coupling relation is what Clark and Chalmers think justifies extended cognition.

What C-C Fallacy? 6

Then a bit later in "The Extended Mind," Clark and Chalmers write,

In these cases [of different modes of Tetris play, use of pencil and paper, etc.], the human organism is linked with an external entity in a two-way interaction, creating a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive system in its own right.  All the components in the system play an active causal role, and they jointly govern behavior in the same sort of way that cognition usually does.  (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 8)

The first sentence indicates that a two-way (causal?) interaction between a person’s mind and certain environmental items, such as a video screen, pencil, and paper and so forth creates a coupled system.  Clark and Chalmers, however, apparently take the existence of extended cognitive systems to be sufficient to establish that cognitive processes extend.   The second sentence backs off of this a bit, noting both that all the components in the system play an active causal role and that there is some kind of cognitive equivalence.

What C-C Fallacy? 5

In running through their three sorts of Tetris play, Clark and Chalmers invoke considerations of something like cognitive equivalence, but they begin the paragraph after that by turning to causal influences:

The kind of case just described is by no means as exotic as it may at first appear.  It is not just the presence of advanced external computing resources which raises the issue, but rather the general tendency of human reasoners to lean heavily on environmental supports. (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 8)

In trying to show that the Tetris case is not exotic, they appeal to humans “leaning” on environmental supports.  This, however, looks like a metaphor for the causal contribution of environmental factors.

What C-C Fallacy? 4

Bounds (pp. 89-91) has a number of quotes which at least suggest that there is a relatively short path from observations of causal environmental influences on cognitive processes to extended cognition processes, but how about reviewing a longer bit of text by Clark and Chalmers?  In the early sections of their paper their appear to be two lines of reasoning meant to support EC.  One is based on causal contribution; the other is based on some sort of "cognitive equivalence" between intracranial processes and transcranial processes.

So, the last sentence of section 1 is "We advocate a very different sort of externalism: an active externalism, based on the active role of the environment in driving cognitive processes" (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 7).  One plausible interpretation here is that there is a coupling-constitution argument being given here.