Post-doctoral position on the Theoretical Foundations of Embodied Cognition

Organization: Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of the Basque Country

Location: San Sebastián, Spain

Field: Computer science - Cybernetics

Requirements:

PhD or equivalent in Computer science;
4 years research experience in cybernetics;
English: excellent;
Knowledge of theories of embodied cognition. Modelling skills using evolutionary approaches and dynamical systems;
Skills in physical simulation and dynamical neural networks. Knowledge of different theories of human movement.

Abstract:

As part of the eSMCs EU project, we are recruiting a postdoctoral researcher to work on the theoretical foundations of embodied cognition through the formulation of minimal models of visually-guided movement and skill acquisition. The post is for 3 years and candidates must have a PhD in embodied cognition and experience in modelling using evolutionary robotics techniques

Description:

The new European project on “Extending Sensorimotor Contingencies to Cognition” (eSMCs) comprises a strong network of neuroscientists, AI experts, roboticists, cognitive scientists and philosophers. Its main objective is to extend notions of sensorimotor embodiment to more complex forms of cognitive performance using theoretical work as well as computational and robotic models. It will also involve behavioural and neurophysiological studies in healthy human subjects and those with movement dysfunction. As part of this project, we are recruiting a postdoctoral researcher for 3 years to work on the theoretical foundations of embodied cognition through the formulation of models of multi-modal skill acquisition, arm movements and locomotion. Suitable candidates would have experience in theoretical of embodied cognition including some of the following: sensorimotor theories of perception, non-representationalist theories of action, and enactive approaches to autonomy, agency and meaning. Candidates should have a theoretical and modelling background with a recent PhD in one of these areas. They should also demonstrate a willingness to engage in productive dialogue with empirical and modelling research.

Deadline: 21-03-2011

Link: http://www.lzf.ehu.es/s0003-home1/en/

Email: ezequiel_dipaolo@ehu.es

Phone number: phone +34 943 018549

A New Enaction Book

This one is edited by John Stewart, Olivier Gapenne and Ezequiel Di Paolo, and published by MIT Press.  It is briefly described here and sold here.

Other books along these lines are Enaction, by Masciotra, Roth, and Mor, and Enaction, Embodiment, Evolutionary Robotics: Simulation Models for a Post-Cognitivist Science of Mind by Rohde.

New post-docs on the Theoretical Foundations of Embodied Cognition

Call for expressions of interest:

Two new post-doctoral positions on the Theoretical Foundations of Embodied Cognition.
As part of a newly funded EU project, we are recruiting two postdoctoral researchers to work on theoretical and philosophical aspects of embodied cognition within our research group at the University of the Basque Country, in San Sebastián, Spain.
The new European project on “Extending Sensorimotor Contingencies to Cognition” (eSMCs) comprises a strong network of neuroscientists, AI experts, roboticists, cognitive scientists and philosophers. Its main objective is to extend notions of sensorimotor embodiment to more complex forms of cognitive performance using theoretical work as well as computational and robotic models. It will also involve behavioural and neurophysiological studies in healthy human subjects and those with movement dysfunction. The consortium includes Andreas Engel (Hamburg), Rolf Pfeifer (Zurich), Peter König (Osnabrück), Ezequiel Di Paolo (Basque Country), Danica Kragic (Stockholm), and Paul Verschure (Barcelona). The project also involves the participation of Alva Noë (Berkeley) and Karl Friston (UCL). The project will start early 2011.
Suitable candidates would have an interest in theoretical and philosophical aspects of embodied cognition including some of the following: sensorimotor theories of perception, non-representationalism, the extended mind, phenomenology of the body and enactive approaches to autonomy, agency and meaning. Candidates should have a theoretical background with a recent PhD in one of these areas. They should also demonstrate a willingness to engage in productive dialogue with empirical and modelling research. Experience in some form of modelling or empirical work is desirable but not required.
One post is due to start in the first quarter of 2011 and the other by mid-2011. The duration of each position is 3 years. Both researchers will work under the direction of Prof Di Paolo, but with important chances for local collaborations and exchanges across the network. The local group (led by Prof Alvaro Moreno) is renowned for its work on the philosophy of biology, complex systems and autonomy, and has recently started new lines on embodied cognition, intersubjectivity, and ethics.

At this stage, we invite informal expressions of interest (including a CV and short statement of research interests) which should be directed to Ezequiel Di Paolo by email at ezequiel_dipaolo @ ehu.es before November 30 2010.

A non-species-specific, non-bio-chauvinistic definition of cognition?

In recent developments, the enactive perspective has started to advance on the intimate connection between the concept of autonomy and sense-making, the normative engagement of a system with its world (Varela 1991, 1997; Weber and Varela 2002; Di Paolo 2005; De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007; Thompson 2007; Di Paolo et al. 2008). The latter is nothing less than a strong candidate for a widely applicable, non-species-specific, non-bio-chauvinist definition of cognition. (Di Paolo, 2009, pp. 11-12).

This last sentence raises a number of issues.

I. Why doesn't cognitivism fit the bill as a non-species-specific definition of cognition?  (Set aside worries about definitions, for the present.)  Cognitivists have regularly been interested the cognitive capacities of non-human animals, e.g. chimpanzee abilities with natural language, animal capacities for self-concepts, animal capacities for tool use. Cognitivism seems to offer a non-specifies-specific "definition" of cognition and, in fact, includes this as a part of its active research program.

II. Why doesn't cognitivism fit the bill as a non-bio-chauvinistic definition of cognition?  After all, many cognitivists think that it is possible to produce computers that think and presumably these could be computers that are not autonomous (i.e., not robots).

III. And, why isn't it that some forms of enactivism are bio-chauvinistic?  Consider the versions of enactivism that claim that "life = cognition".  (Cf. Di Paolo, 2009, p. 12).  Or what of versions for which being cognitive entails being alive.

On Di Paolo's Enactivism, Is the Visual System not a Cognitive System?

If the visual system is not self-producing (as seems plausible), then it is not autopoeitic.  But, if it is not autopoeitic, then it is not a robust, adaptative autopoeitic system either, so then, by Di Paolo's account, it is not a cognitive system either.

I mention this "problem" for Di Paolo, but it seems to me a consequence of any version of an autopoetic account of cognition.

Now, I put problem in scare quotes, because this may simply be what the autopoeitic folks want to say about the visual system.  They do, after all, tend to have different target concepts for cognitive scientists than do, say, cognitivists.  No cognitivist, as far as I know, thinks that plants, slime molds, and bacteria are cognitive systems, but at least some in the autopoeitic camp do.

Di Paolo on Cognition and Sense Making

Earlier, I noted that, according to Di Paolo,

Only of the subset of autopoietic systems that are not just robust but also adaptive can we say that they possess operational mechanisms to potentially distinguish the different virtual implications of otherwise equally viable paths of encounters with the environment. (Di Paolo, 2009, p. 14).

But, this is followed immediately by this:

Only of the subset of autopoietic systems that are not just robust but also adaptive can we say that they posses operational mechanisms to potentially distinguish the different virtual implications of otherwise equally viable paths of encounters with the environment. This differential operation is called sense-making (Weber and Varela 2002; Di Paolo 2005; Thompson 2007). If, as proposed, sense-making requires the acquisition of ‘‘a valence which is dual at its basis: attraction or rejection, approach or escape’’(Weber and Varela 2002, p. 117), a system engaged in sense-making requires, apart from the norm given by self-construction, access to how it currently stands against the all-or-nothing barrier given by that norm.  (Di Paolo, 2009, pp. 14-15).

But, here it seems that sense-making requires more than just robustness and adaptivity.   The issue is that sense-making requires a valence, which does not seem to be guaranteed by having a robust, adaptive autopoeitic system.  The problem is that one might well have a system that can "possess operational mechanisms to potentially distinguish the different virtual implications of otherwise equally viable paths of encounters with the environment", yet have no valence about those different implications.

Di Paolo on Cognitive Systems

So, last time, it seemed that Di Paolo should say that a cognitive system is an autopoeitic system that operates according to potential future states, but that he does not just say this.

Instead, Di Paolo offers a theory of what it is to operate according to potential future states. He writes,

Only of the subset of autopoietic systems that are not just robust but also adaptive can we say that they posses operational mechanisms to potentially distinguish the different virtual implications of otherwise equally viable paths of encounters with the environment. (Di Paolo, 2009, p. 14).

By "robust" he means:

can sustain a certain range of perturbations as well as a certain range of internal structural changes without losing their autopoiesis. These limits are defined by the organization and current state of the system (ibid.)

By "adaptive" he means:

a system’s capacity, in some circumstances, to regulate its states and its relation to the environment with the result that, if the states are sufficiently close to the limits of its viability,
1. tendencies are distinguished and acted upon depending on whether the states will approach or recede from these proximal limits and, as a consequence,
2. tendencies that approach these limits are moved closer to or transformed into tendencies that do not approach them and so future states are prevented from reaching these limits with an outward velocity.  (ibid.)

Di Paolo on Bare Autopoesis

Like much of the work on autopoeisis, I find Di Paolo's exposition a bit difficult to follow.  I just don't have the sense of the problematic here.  But, here's my take on the upshot of section 4.1.

Nothing can be a cognitive system simply in virtue of being an autopoeitic system.  Why?  Cognitive systems operate according to potential future states, but an autopoeitic system does not necessarily operate this way.

Now, one might expect the solution to this problem would be to say that a cognitive system is an autopoeitic system that operates according to potential future states.  But things do not appear to be that simple...

Di Paolo on Extended Mind 3

[The] organism is linked with an external entity in a two-way interaction, creating a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive system in its own right. All the components in the system play an active causal role, and they jointly govern behavior in the same sort of way that cognition usually does. If we remove the external component the system’s behavioral competence will drop, just as it would if we removed part of its brain. Our thesis is that this sort of coupled process counts equally well as a cognitive process, whether or not it is wholly in the head (Clark and Chalmers 1998, p. 7).

This seems to suggest a practical and operational way out of the problem. Perform a causal analysis of the coupled system and work out what processes contribute to cognitive performance. But of course, without a measure of relevance, a causal analysis will inevitably invite an unbounded spread of causes (e.g., isn’t oxygen obviously crucial for a human to solve math problems?). It is clear that what counts as cognitive (the second boundary) should be the measure that determines the relevance of the causal contribution of a given process. But this leads us again to the problem already stated. The only test of the cognitive offered by EM is whether we intuitively would call something cognitive were it to happen in the head. (Di Paolo, 2009, p. 10).

And, I have to agree that the way to separate what merely causally influences cognition and what constitutes cognition is to have a mark of the cognitive.  We need a theory of what distinguishes cognitive processes from non-cognitive processes.

Di Paolo on Extended Mind 2

Before asking where it is we must first say what it is. This is the single major problem with the way EM theorists have approached the genuine question of whether extra-neural, extra-bodily material processes are a constitutive part of what we intuitively recognize as cognitive processes. Relying solely on those intuitions is the problem. (Di Paolo, 2009, p. 10).

I've got to agree with the need for a mark of the cognitive.

Di Paolo on Extended Mind 1

Di Paolo begins his paper,

In a recent article, Wheeler (in press) has put a question mark on the relation between enactivism (in its life/mind continuity version, e.g., Varela et al. 1991; Thompson 2007) and the extended mind (EM) hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers 1998). His conclusion spells gloom for the prospects of a unified non-Cartesian cognitive science: enactivism and EM are demonstrably incompatible!

This conclusion seems at odds with the spontaneous understanding of enactivism as proposing a view of cognition as fundamentally embodied and situated and the (apparently!) parallel understanding of EM as signalling how much of our cognitive skills rely crucially on the availability of non-biological epistemic technologies.  (Di Paolo, 2009, p. 9. italics added).

Now, as I understand it, EM says more than that our cognitive skills rely crucially on the availability of non-biological epistemic technologies.  This sounds like the causal claim that cognition is causally influenced by non-biological epistemic technologies.  But, EM makes the stronger claim that cognition is constituted, in part, by the available non-biological epistemic technologies.  Or, to put the matter in another way, the phrase "rely crucially on" is at best ambiguous between a causal and a constitutive reading.

Avoiding these ambiguities is one reason to keep a distinction between causal and constitutive claims front and center in the EC debates.

Future Posts

Having seen the program of the First European Summer School of Life and Cognition, I was moved to read Ezequiel Di Paolo's "Extended Life".  So, I should have a few posts on this in the coming days.