Who Supports Supplementary EC?

Who thinks that, in addition to the intracranial cognition that has been studied in the past, there is also transcranial cognition that is "just like" intracranial cognition?

Given the Inga-Otto example, Clark probably should count as a defender of Supplementary EC.  For Clark, the "just like" has to do with "sameness of functional poise", whatever that amounts to.

Mark Sprevak, in "Extended Cognition and Functionalism", also seems to support Supplementary EC.  For Sprevak, the "just like" has to do with some "general categories of cognition", whatever that amounts to.

Justin Fisher, in his critical notice of Bounds, also seems to support Supplementary EC.  For Fisher, like Sprevak, the "just like" has to do with some "general categories of cognition".

Supplementary EC

Supplementary EC proposes that, in addition to the intracranial cognition that has been studied in the past, there is also transcranial cognition that is "just like" intracranial cognition.  (The qualifier "just like"covers a multitude of issues.)

Another way of thinking about this kind of EC is that it adopts a "fractal scaling" approach. In fractal scaling, one has structures at one size scale that are mirrored at a larger scale.  So, think of Inga-Otto.  Inga has memories on the size scale of the brain; Otto has memories on the size scale of brain-body-world.

Two Types of EC: Supplementary and Revolutionary

Here is a distinction among types of EC that seems to be worth considering, if for no other reason than that they bring with them distinct argumentative burdens.

Supplementary EC proposes that, in addition to the intracranial cognition that has been studied in the past, there is also transcranial cognition that is "just like" intracranial cognition.  (The qualifier "just like"covers a multitude of issues.)

Revolutionary EC proposes that there is no intracranial cognition, only transcranial cognition.