Computation in Action by Erik Myin

COGNITION IN ACTION LECTURE SERIES


"Computation in Action "
by  Erik Myin
(Universiteit Antwerpen)


Monday April 18, at 4.30 pm
Room 104
University of Milan, via Festa del Perdono 3


Abstract
In this talk, I contrast the idea of computation as an overt activity of a person, as when someone calculates on a blackboard, with the  idea of computation as inner activity that can be carried out by neurons or neural networks. I argue that the active notion is fundamental, both in a logical and a historical sense. That is, Turing’s concept of mechanical computation was derived from the idea of active computation, and the latter remains necessary to make sense of the former. It follows from all this, so I will argue, that the concept of inner computation, as allegedly carried out by neurons or neural networks, has a much more restricted range of application than usually assumed. Then I turn to the question whether the notion of active computation can be applied beyond its paradigmatic context or norm-bound symbol manipulation, to perception. Can persons be said to compute three-dimensional depth by moving their eyes, heads and bodies? Finally, I address the question whether and in what sense overt computational activity whether can be ‘internalized’, for example when a person performs mental arithmetic.


More info: http://neurophilosophy.unimi.it/


Corrado Sinigaglia
Department of Philosophy
University of Milan
via Festa del Perdono 7
20122 Milano - Italy
e-mail corrado.sinigag...@unimi.it
http://dipartimento.filosofia.unimi.it/index.php/corrado-sinigaglia/
http://neurophilosophy.unimi.it
http://moregeometrico.unimi.it

Hurley's Observations on Braille Readers

To take one fascinating idea, consider Susan Hurley on “variable neural correlates.”  We are comfortable with the correlation between types of experience and types of brain states, and undoubtedly such variation is one important source for the idea that the mind is in the head. Hurley notes, however, that there is also a dependence of experience on type of interaction with the environment, one not aligned to strictly neural properties. For example, when blind people haptically read Braille text, activity in the visual cortex seems to correlate with tactile experience. In people who are not blind, tactile experience correlates with activity in the tactile cortex. What explains the common enabling of tactile experience by the different kinds of cortex seems to be tactile causal coupling with the environment, rather than strictly neural type. (Myin, 2010, p. 590).

I haven't read all of Hurley's long and difficult paper, "Varieties of Externalism," but by Myin's account, it looks to be an instance of the kind of argument Noë gives in his Out of Our Heads book.  I give the cartoon reply here.  I discuss this argument in more detail in my "Consciousness: Don't Give up on the Brain."

So, it looks like I should look over the science concerning the brains of those who read Braille.

Myin on the Critics of EC

Clark and Chalmers’s paper has triggered a vigorous and continuing debate. Nonbelievers concede that numerous tight causal couplings between minds and environments exist, but they deny that it therefore makes sense to speak of an extended mind instead of a mind in a person that closely interacts with an environment. All things considered, they argue, thoughts remain in persons—never in objects like notebooks, however closely dependent a person could become on them. (Myin, 2010, p. 590).

Saying that we deny that it makes sense to speak of an extended mind is not exactly how I think Adams, Aizawa, or Rupert put the matter.  Instead, it is that the existence of tight causal couplings does not warrant the conclusion that the mind extends.

And, Adams, Aizawa, and Rupert admit that extended cognition is possible; only it does not appear to occur in the cases described advocates in the EC literature.  So, the last part has to be read carefully.  It is a bit strong maybe to say simply that thoughts remain in persons--never in objects like notebooks.  On the other hand, the whole sentence has a correct parse, I think, if one is takes it to mean that thoughts do not extend in virtue of close causal couplings.

But, one should bear in mind that there are other arguments for EC, beside the close causal coupling sorts of arguments.

Myin's Review of Menary's The Extended Mind

Unbounding the Mind
Erik Myin
Science 29 October 2010: 589-590.