In Memoriam: John Haugeland (1945-2010)

I have long thought that Haugeland's "Mind Embodied and Embedded" is one of the underappreciated papers in the extended cognition literature.

Obit.

Rowlands on the Rationale for EC

 In "Enactivism and the Extended Mind", Rowlands writes,

It is possible to understand EM as asserting a necessary truth about the composition of mental processes: that, necessarily, some mental processes are partly constituted by processes of environmental manipulation, etc. It is possible, but inadvisable. The underlying rationale for EM is provided by a liberal form of functionalism. And the entire thrust of liberal functionalism is to leave open the possibility of different ways of realizing the same (type of) mental process. By understanding EM as asserting a necessary truth, therefore, the proponent of EM is at risk of undermining his or her own primary motivation. (p. 54).

But, I don't think there is a consensus that "The underlying rationale for EM is provided by a liberal form of functionalism"  Liberal functionalism does not seem to be Haugeland's rationale for EC.  Nor does it seems to be Chemero's rationale for EC (his rationale being some combination of dynamical systems theory and Gibsonian ecological psychology).

Haugeland's Approach to Revolutionary EC

I noted that one reason to distinguish revolutionary and supplementary EC is that they bear different explanatory burdens.  So, recall one way that Haugeland argues for revolutionary EC.  He argues that the brain is not a component of the cognitive system, since there is no interface between the brain, body, and world.  So, this is revolutionary ...  rejecting intracranial cognition.

As an aside, one might think that, if your theory of what a system is tells you that the brain is not a component of the cognitive system, then you should check your theory of what a system is.  One person's modus ponens is another's modus tollens, after all.

Who Supports Revolutionary EC? 1

Who supports the view that there is no intracranial cognition, only transcranial cognition?  Actually, a surprising number of folks.  Apparently, John Haugeland for one:

Intelligence, then, is nothing other than the overall interactive structure of meaningful behavior and objects. … Perhaps the basic idea can be brought out this way.  Intelligence is the ability to deal reliably with more than the present and the manifest.  (Haugeland, 1998, p. 230)