Ramsey on Ross and Ladyman

Finally, undoubtedly the oddest chapter is this volume is one that inadvertently suggests that the whole topic is deeply ill-conceived. In a somewhat condescending tone, Don Ross and James Ladyman tell us that that the coupling-constitution fallacy is based upon a naive and flawed conception of reality, since, at the level of fundamental physics, conventional notions like causation and constitution have no real application. Curiously, they see this as only a problem for the critics of EMH. Given that EMH itself depends on the idea that certain things are parts of other things (minds), their conclusion should have been that EMH is itself a confused non-issue (presumably, their essay isn't "part of" a volume devoted to such a non-issue). Perhaps the real take-home lesson from this chapter is something most of us already believed; namely, that whatever bizarre things physicists tell us about fundamental particles, their statements should have very little bearing on what we think about middle-sized things like cognitive systems.

I like it.

What's Wrong with Rhodopsin?

Looking up info for another blog post, I see that Adams and Aizawa gave another example trying to indicate what the coupling-constitution distinction might be (rather than trying to give a philosophical account of what the distinction might be).   The process is the isomerization of rhodopsin upon photon capture.

    Both Rockwell, (2005), and Hurley, (forthcoming), express skepticism about the coupling-constitution distinction, although neither express serious reasons for doubting the distinction.  There is, it seems to us, some reason for their suspicion, namely, that it is hard to make out this distinction for the case of cognition.  What is the difference between things that merely cause cognitive processes and things that constitute cognitive processes?  If we restate the question slightly, the source of the difficulty should be clear.  What, we should ask, is the difference between things that merely cause cognitive processes and things are cognitive processes?  The problem lies in the uncertainty about what exactly cognitive processes are. In support of this diagnosis, consider a case where we do have a well-established theory of what a given type of process is.  Consider again the process of nuclear fission.  The process of nuclear fission is constituted by the process of a large atomic nucleus being broken into smaller atomic nuclei.  Nuclear fission can be caused by bombardment of the nucleus with neutrons.  The process of neutron bombardment causes nuclear fission, but does not constitute nuclear fission.  Consider the isomerization of the retinal component of rhodopsin in the human eye.  This process is constituted by a change in the molecular structure of the retinal component from 11-cis retinal to all-trans retinal.  It is typically caused by absorption of a photon.  Now the distinction is intuitively clear, although possibly difficult to explicate philosophically.  Where we have a clear theory of the nature of a process, we have a very fair idea of the difference between what might cause it and what might constitute it. (Adams & Aizawa, 2008, p. 101).

They object to the nuclear fission example because "the literal description of nuclear fission is mathematical and incorporates no such simple intuition".  (Ross and Ladyman, 2010, p. 163).  Ok.  So, what's the problem with the rhodopsin example?

Benighted Methodology

I'm kind of surprised at the popularity of replies to the Adams and Aizawa that are based on attributing to us some benighted methodology.  According to Rob Wilson, with our concern for the mark of the cognitive, we are doing conceptual analysis.  According to Tony Chemero, we are doing a priori metaphysics.  According to Susan Hurley, with drawing attention to the role of causation versus constitution, we are doing metaphysics in advance of looking to actual scientific practice.  According to Ladyman and Ross, by drawing attention to the c-c distinction, we are doing primitive analytic metaphysics.

But, as I see things, the debate over EC involves both conceptual issues and empirical issues.  So, suppose you think that physical actions are constitutive of perceptual experiences, rather than mere causal influences on perceptual experiences.  Then, there is a need for some conceptual clarity regarding causation versus constitution.  It's a distinction that is found in actual cognitive science, rather than stylized cognitive science.  It's more than just a philosopher's fiction.  Moreover, there is plenty of empirical evidence that bears on the claim that physical actions are constitutive of perceptual experiences.  The Bounds of Cognition, Chapter 9, bears this out by mixing both conceptual matters and empirical matters.

I think that working through philosophical issues in cognitive science in a serious way involves both conceptual/theoretical and empirical issues.  I don't see that I differ from Wilson, Chemero, Hurley, Ladyman, or Ross very much at all when it comes to a philosophical methodology of taking cognitive science seriously.  Where we seem to find real differences is in the consequences we draw from taking cognitive science seriously.

This makes no sense in physical theory?

So, here is how Adams and I informally introduce the C-C fallacy in a recent paper:

In our view, the coupling arguments are fallacious.   They commit what we call the “coupling-constitution fallacy.”  We can see that it is in fact a fallacy by consideration of some examples.  Consider the bi-metallic strip in an ordinary thermostat.  The expansion and contraction of this strip is closely coupled to the ambient temperature of a room and the air conditioning apparatus for that room.  Nevertheless, this gives us no reason to say that the expansion and contraction of the strip extends beyond the limits of the strip and into the room or air conditioner.  (Adams & Aizawa, 2009, p. 81).

Of the many things that Adams and I have written, this would seem to me to be pretty tame and unproblematic.  But, not so to Ross and Ladyman,

Unfortunately, Adams and Aizawa's discussions of constitution appear to be wholly based on naive objectification of everyday containment metaphors. Their leading example appeals to intuitions denying that the processes by which the bimetallic strip of a thermostat expands and contracts in correlation with states of room temperature and the activation of the air conditioning system "extend beyond the limits of the strip and into the room or air conditioner" (Adams and Aizawa 2008a,b). But neither the sentence "The expansion and contraction occur inside the strip" nor "The room is not the smallest container inside which the expansion and contraction are contained" admits of any possible translation into the terms of physical theory; the claims are irreducibly metaphorical. (Ross & Ladyman, 2010, p. 161.)

So, neither of the sentences can be translated into the terms of physical theory.  But, so what?  Those sentences seem to be mere bad initial takes on what we are saying.  Reminds me of Mark Twain's own translation of a speech he delivered in German to the Vienna Press Club:

I am indeed the truest friend of the German language-and not only now, but from long since-yes, before twenty years already ....  I would only some changes effect. I would only the language
method-the luxurious, elaborate construction compress, the eternal parenthesis suppress, do away with, annihilate; the introduction of more than thirteen subjects in one sentence forbid; the verb so far to the front pull that one it without a telescope discover can. With one word, my gentlemen, I would your beloved language simplify so that, my gentlemen, when you her for prayer need, One her yonder-up understands.

(From Steven Pinker's The Language Instinct, p. 61)

But, more seriously, there is really no way to make sense of the fact that when the bimetallic strip gets warmer it expands, but the room does not?  I don't know the rules of Ross and Ladyman's translation game, but if you can't make sense of our first paragraph by those rules, it might be time to check the rules.

Where in the World are Cognitive Processes?

The grip of the containment metaphor on Adams and Aizawa is particularly clear when they claim that the following is an important question for science: "What regions of spacetime contain cognitive processing?" Not only is this not a question actually posed by any science, it is not a question that has literal sense in the technical vocabulary of any science. The closest we can get to it is (roughly): "Which set of events have episodes of cognitive processing in their backward light cones?" (Ross & Ladyman, 2010, p. 161).

I. "What regions of spacetime contain cognitive processing?" is one take on what is in question in the EC debate.  And, some cognitive scientists have embraced this kind of question.  So, it is at least to that degree an important question for science.  Maybe some philosophers do not think it is important.

II. In any event, I would have thought that the way to scientize a question like "What regions of spacetime contain cognitive processing?" would be in terms of something like some sort of spacetime "worm".  But L&R probably don't like the "worm" metaphor either, so why not take the mathematically correct interpretation of, or replacement for, the metaphor? 

Ladyman & Ross on the Metaphysics of Domestication

**

Elsewhere (Ladyman and Ross 2007) we argue against what we call the metaphysics of domestication, which consists of attempts to render pieces of contemporary science-and, more often, stylized or mythical interpretations of contemporary science-into terms that can be made sense of by reference to the containment metaphor. Domesticating metaphysicians seek to account for the world as "made of" myriad "little things" in roughly the way that (some) walls are made of bricks. Unlike bricks in walls, however, the little things are often held to be in motion. Their causal powers are usually understood as manifest in the effects they have on each other when they collide. Thus the causal structure of the world is imagined to be based on emergent or reducible consequences of reverberating networks of what we call "microbangings"-the types of ultimate causal relations that prevail among the basic types of little things, whatever exactly those turn out to be. Metaphysicians, especially recently, are heavily preoccupied with the search for "genuine causal oomph," particularly in relation to what they perceive to be the competition between different levels of reality.
     This picture, familiar as it is, finds absolutely no corresponding image in contemporary fundamental physics. The types of particles which physical theory describes do not have spatiotemporal boundaries in anything like what common sense takes for granted in conceptualizing everyday objects, and in that respect are not classical individuals-the philosopher's little things (French and Krause 2006). There are nothing like microbangings in fundamental physics; indeed whether there is causation in any sense that doesn't stretch the meaning of the word to the point of obscurantism is often disputed (Norton 2007; Ross and Spurrett 2007; Ladyman and Ross 2007, chap. 5).

Ok.  So, the metaphysics of domestication mischaracterizes fundamental physics.  So be it.  How does the metaphysics of domestication fare for contemporary psychology or neuroscience?  I'm thinking that the contact forces model of causation may well fail to characterize causation in contemporary psychology and neuroscience, but there are other theories of causation out there.  I'm thinking that synaptic vesicles contain neurotransmitters.

I'm thinking that contemporary "immature" (if you will) cognitive science includes drawing a distinction between what causes a cognitive process and what is a cognitive process, so that ignoring this would be a case of failing to be true to actual cognitive science.

Ross, Ladyman, and "Metaphysical Hunches"

As is typical of philosophers promoting metaphysical hunches, Adams and Aizawa (2001) explicitly associate the internalist view with "common sense,"

I'm probably as much against "metaphysical hunches" as are 70% of philosophers, but I don't think that "common sense" must only be a reflection of prejudice, thoughtlessness, or metaphysical hunches.  I think the idea that mental or cognitive processes take place in the brain is supported by certain relatively informal experiences with injuries in battle.  (I've posted a sketchy speculative description of his idea here.)  It's a kind of defeasible empirical conjecture (that I happen to think is also reinforced by more rigorous scientific work) and not a mere metaphysical hunch. The conjecture could be false, but it would still be a false a posteriori, empirical conjecture.

Ross & Ladyman's "Alleged Coupling-Constitution Fallacy" 3

In the last post, I noted Ross & Ladyman seem to think that we should look to actual scientific practice to determine what one should believe.

The idea that there might be a justified general such claim about all cognitive models, which could rationally be made in advance of tackling specific modeling problems one at a time (Ross & Ladyman, 2010, p. 156).

Now, from this one might think that Ross and Ladyman think that the proper basis for making justified general claims about all cognitive models would be to look at the results of specific cognitive modeling problems.  But, that's not right.  Instead, they think the proper basis would be to look at the results of modeling in mature sciences, such as fundamental physics.

And, again, Rupert, Adams, and Aizawa suppose that they are not trying to justify their views in advance of tacking specific scientific problems. They try to justify their views by appeal to actual scientific practice.  It's the advocates of EC who sometimes want to appeal to something other than actual scientific practice.

Ross & Ladyman's "Alleged Coupling-Constitution Fallacy" 2

extended mind thesis and its internalist rival can be interpreted as alternative claims about what kind of ontology of systems any cognitive model should presuppose.  The idea that there might be a justified general such claim about all cognitive models, which could rationally be made in advance of tackling specific modeling problems one at a time, would have to be based either on a universal tractability constraint or on metaphysics. (Ross & Ladyman, 2010, p. 156).

Two things here.

I) I don't see the internalist/externalist debate as, in the first instance, offering alternative claims about what kind of ontology of systems any cognitive model should presuppose.  There is some question about what the ontology of cognition is--e.g., whether cognition involves representations--but once that is settled the core question becomes where in the world one finds those bits of ontology.  So, ontology is, at most, only part of what is in play in the EC debates.

II) I think that Ross and Ladyman are missing what is going on in the EC literature.  They refer to this "idea that there might be a justified general such claim about all cognitive models, which could rationally be made in advance of tackling specific modeling problems one at a time".  But, Rupert, Adams and I take it that there has been this enterprise of cognitive psychology that has been going on for some decades and that one can extract from that some basic conclusions about cognitive ontology.  In fact, I think that most parties to the EC debate probably agree to the method of abstracting conclusions about cognitive ontology from actual scientific practice. (Maybe not the same scientific practice, mind you.  Some folks extrapolate from Gibson, where others extrapolate from other sources.)  Where parties to the EC debate differ is in what they think is correct to abstract from that actual scientific practice.

Ross & Ladyman's "Alleged Coupling-Constitution Fallacy" 1

This paper began life as an account of how Adams and Aizawa were stuck in the 17th Century with immature (pre-?)scientific metaphysical assumptions about causation and constitution.

After a very enjoyable dinner at King's College, Cambridge, (hosted by Mark Sprevak as part of a workshop on Computation in Cognitive Science), I was able to encourage James to revisit the draft of the paper that I had seen.  I proposed that the problems they had with causation and constitution were not the doing of Adams and Aizawa, but were part and parcel of much of the EC debate.  So, now the paper is about how (almost?) everyone in the EC debate is stuck in the 17th Century with immature (pre-?)scientific metaphysical assumptions about causation and constitution.

Ross and Ladyman should be happy about this revision, since they are now going after more and bigger fish than just Adams and Aizawa.  Adams and I are happy, since now the mess is not our fault.

One of the challenges of responding to the Ross-Ladyman critique, however, is that they are not so much interested in adjudicating the particular issues that arise in the EC debate as they are making the case that everything must go.

Nevertheless, I think that even though they are now dumping on the whole EC debate, they are coming down a bit too hard.  I won't try to "refute" the criticisms so much as try to make it less obvious that the whole EC debate is mired in the useless and primitive.  (A modest goal to be sure...)

Future Posts 8/20/2010

Still working through Menary's The Extended Mind.  Next up: Ross and Ladyman, then Wilson.

Burden Shifting

Hurley (chapter 6) and Ross and Ladyman (chapter 7) are concerned about the very nature of the alleged fallacy. Hurley complains that philosophers employ the causal-constitutive distinction, on which the causal coupling fallacy trades, without motivating or explaining the distinction in detail. Ross and Ladyman argue that the distinction itself is not used in mature sciences such as economics and physics. (Menary, 2010, p. 13).

I don't take it to be my job to explicate the coupling-constitution distinction that the EC folks use to articulate their view.  That's their job.  They are the ones who say that the environment does not merely causally influence cognitive processes, but that they constitute those cognitive processes.

But, matters are not as hopeless as Hurley might suggest.  There is some discussion of causation versus realization and constitution in, for example, Aizawa, K., and Gillett, C., The (Multiple) Realization of Psychological and other Properties in the Sciences. (2009). Mind & Language, 24, 181-208.  Maybe giving this reply is a mug's game though.  No matter how much we might say in explication of the distinction, it's easy enough for a philosopher to complain that we have not said enough or that what we say is not convincing.

So, really, if the distinction collapses, it's mostly ok by me.  Maybe psychologists can press on without the burdens of rethinking their discipline based on a confused philosophical distinction.