Tuesday, February 28, 2012
Open Positions at Ruhr University Bochum
I'm going to spend a couple of months at RUB this summer, along with (at overlapping times) Colin Allen, Cameron Buckner, and Nivedita Gangopadhyay, among others. I'm very much looking forward to it, so perhaps others would be interested as well.
Info here.
Info here.
Sprevak at the State University of Milan
COGNITION IN ACTION LECTURE SERIES (2012)
Department of Philosophy, State University of Milan
How does the situated cognition program justify the extended mind?
Mark Sprevak (University of Edinburgh)
Thursday, 8th March 2012
4.30pm - 6.30pm
Room 435
More info: http://neurophilosophy.unimi.it/index.php/events/icalrepeat.detail/20...
Department of Philosophy, State University of Milan
How does the situated cognition program justify the extended mind?
Mark Sprevak (University of Edinburgh)
Thursday, 8th March 2012
4.30pm - 6.30pm
Room 435
More info: http://neurophilosophy.unimi.it/index.php/events/icalrepeat.detail/20...
Monday, February 27, 2012
Ulatowski's Review of Menary's Extended Mind
Here at Metapsychology.
Thanks to Leslie Marsh for bringing my attention to it. We seem to be fishing up many of the same things these days.
Thanks to Leslie Marsh for bringing my attention to it. We seem to be fishing up many of the same things these days.
Saturday, February 25, 2012
Thursday, February 23, 2012
Noe's Varieties of Presence
So, I got my advanced order copy from Amazon yesterday. I only read a very few pages, but it does have a different "feel" than his other two books. I'm hoping I'll get to do a reading group on the book this summer with folks at the Ruhr University, Bochum, but we shall see.
Maybe I'll have a few posts on this as well.
Maybe I'll have a few posts on this as well.
Tuesday, February 21, 2012
EC over at The Post-Cognitivist Blog (University College, Dublin)
Link.
But, in theory, there could be extended cognitivist cognition. It's just as a matter of contingent empirical fact, there appears not to be any.
But, in theory, there could be extended cognitivist cognition. It's just as a matter of contingent empirical fact, there appears not to be any.
Monday, February 20, 2012
Andrew and Sabrina Interviewed for Psychology Today Blog
The discussion.
"Many researchers treat embodied cognition as the idea that the contents of these mental states/representations can be influenced by the states of our bodies."
Does anyone but Leibniz think that the contents of mental states/representations cannot be influenced by the states of our bodies?
"Many researchers treat embodied cognition as the idea that the contents of these mental states/representations can be influenced by the states of our bodies."
Does anyone but Leibniz think that the contents of mental states/representations cannot be influenced by the states of our bodies?
Monday, February 13, 2012
Andy Clark at Washington and Lee Univeristy
So, this is kind of cool. The senior philosophy majors at W&L will get a talk from Andy after having read some of his stuff. W&L is in the same academic consortium as my institution, Centenary, only they are in the rich end of the consortium, where we are in the poor end.
Monday, February 6, 2012
Embodiment, Computation And the Nature of Artificial Intelligence
Article over at MIT's Technology Review.
Saturday, February 4, 2012
Mark of the Living?
Looking over paper titles, it looks as though many of the positions one finds regarding the putative mark of the cognitive are hashed out as well in the context of questions about what is alive. See this special issue of Synthese.
Friday, February 3, 2012
"The Mark of the Cognitive" Workshop
Fred Keijzer and Catarina Dutilh Novaes are organizing the following:
DATE: May 11th 2012, 9.30 to 18.00
PLACE: Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen
ATTENDANCE: All welcome, but please send a message to cdutilhnovaes at yahoo dot com if you intend to come.
In recent discussions on the notion of embodied/extended
cognition and the extended mind hypothesis, the idea of a ‘mark of the
cognitive’ has received quite some attention. Both among the proponents
and among the critics of Extended Mind, many authors agree that the
project of formulating a principled demarcation for what is to count as
cognitive is imperative, not only with respect to this specific debate
but more generally as a fundamental question for the philosophy of
cognitive science. A few dissident voices, however, have considered the
possibility of this question being neither crucial nor answerable, for
example by relying on anti-essentialist conceptions of cognition.
Against this background, the Faculty of Philosophy of the
University of Groningen is hosting a one-day workshop to discuss the
very idea of the mark of the cognitive, in particular but not
exclusively with respect to the concept of embodied/extended cognition.
How should the question be formulated? Is it a matter of stipulating a
definition, or are we after a substantive theory of what cognition is?
Is 'the cognitive' a natural kind? How important is it to delineate a
mark of the cognitive for different projects in philosophy of mind and
cognitive science? These and other questions will be addressed during
the talks and discussions at the workshop.
SPEAKERS AND TITLES
Kenneth Aizawa (Centenary College): Operationalism gives the Mark of the Cognitive?
Julian Kiverstein (University of Amsterdam): Intentionality as the mark of the cognitive?
Fred Keijzer (University of Groningen): The need for a mark of something that we should call cognition
Catarina Dutilh Novaes (University of Groningen): Second-wave Extended Mind does not need a mark of the cognitive
Wednesday, February 1, 2012
CfP: Distributed cognition and memory research: How do distributed memory systems work?
I wish I had time to write for this ...
Special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Guest editors: Kourken Michaelian and John Sutton
Call for Papers
Deadline for submissions: July 15, 2012
According to the extended mind hypothesis in philosophy of cognitive
science and the related distributed cognition hypothesis in cognitive
anthropology, remembering does not always occur entirely inside the
brain, but can also be distributed across heterogeneous systems
combining neural, bodily, social, and technological resources. Much of
the critical debate on these ideas in philosophy has so far remained
at some distance from relevant empirical studies. But claims about
extended mind and distributed cognition, if they are to deserve wider
acceptance, must both make sense of and, in turn, inform work in the
cognitive and social sciences. Is the notion of extended or
distributed remembering consistent with the findings of empirical
memory research? Can such a view of memory usefully inform empirical
work, suggesting further areas of productive enquiry or helping to
make sense of existing findings?
This special issue will bring together supporters and critics of
extended and distributed cognition, to consider memory as a test case
for evaluating and further developing these hypotheses. Submitted
papers should thus address both memory and distributed cognition/
extended mind: ideally, papers should aim simultaneously to make
contributions to relevant debates in both philosophy and psychology or
other relevant empirical fields. While primarily theoretical papers
are welcome, they should make direct contact with empirical findings.
Similarly, while empirically-oriented papers might draw on evidence
from a range of areas, including the cognitive psychology of
transactive memory and collaborative recall, cognitive anthropology
and cognitive ethnography, science studies and the philosophy of
science, the history of memory practices, and the cognitive
archaeology of material culture, they should seek to advance the
theoretical debate over extended mind and distributed cognition,
rather than simply presenting findings from these fields.
Potential topics include (but are not limited to):
Relations between biological memory and external memory
How do forms of representation and storage in neural and external
memory differ, and why do such differences matter? Can theories of
distributed cognition deal with the existence of multiple memory
systems? For example, does the expert deployment of exograms in
certain external symbol systems affect working memory? How might the
development and operation of distributed memory systems affect neural
memory processes? Is evidence for neuroplasticity relevant for
assessing claims about distributed remembering? Given plausible links
between memory and self, what might distributed memory systems imply
about identity and agency? What happens when distributed memory
systems fail or break down?
How do distributed memory systems work?
What is socially distributed remembering, and does it offer any
support to revived ideas about group cognition, or to a naturalized
understanding of collective memory? Can theories of extended or
distributed cognition encompass socially distributed remembering in
addition to artifacts and other forms of memory scaffolding? What are
the implications of experimental studies of collaborative recall and
transactive memory for theories of distributed cognition? How do such
theories deal with memory practices and rituals, and with the roles of
the non-symbolic material environment?
Distributed memory and embodied cognition
How central in theories of extended or distributed memory should be
the study of skill acquisition and of expertise in the deployment of
external resources? What accounts of embodied skills, procedural
memory, and smooth or absorbed coping are required to support such
theories? How do distributed memory systems work in specific contexts
of embodied interaction, from conversation to music, dance,
performance, and sport?
Guest authors
The issue will include invited articles authored by:
Robert Rupert, University of Colorado (Boulder)
Deborah Tollefsen, University of Memphis, and Rick Dale, University of California (Merced)
Mike Wheeler, University of Stirling
Important dates
Submission deadline: July 15, 2012
Target publication date: December 15, 2012
How to submit
Prospective authors should register at: www.editorialmanager.com/ropp
to obtain a login and select Distributed cognition and memory research
as an article type. Manuscripts should be approximately 6,000 words.
Submissions should follow the author guidelines available on the
journal's website.
About the journal
The Review of Philosophy and Psychology (ISSN: 1878-5158; eISSN:
1878-5166) is a peer-reviewed journal published quarterly by Springer
and focusing on philosophical and foundational issues in cognitive
science. The aim of the journal is to provide a forum for discussion
on topics of mutual interest to philosophers and psychologists and to
foster interdisciplinary research at the crossroads of philosophy and
the sciences of the mind, including the neural, behavioural and social
sciences. The journal publishes theoretical works grounded in
empirical research as well as empirical articles on issues of
philosophical relevance. It includes thematic issues featuring invited
contributions from leading authors together with articles answering a
call for paper.
Contact
For any queries, please email the guest editors:
kmichaelian@bilkent.edu.tr, john.sutton@mq.edu.au
Special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Guest editors: Kourken Michaelian and John Sutton
Call for Papers
Deadline for submissions: July 15, 2012
According to the extended mind hypothesis in philosophy of cognitive
science and the related distributed cognition hypothesis in cognitive
anthropology, remembering does not always occur entirely inside the
brain, but can also be distributed across heterogeneous systems
combining neural, bodily, social, and technological resources. Much of
the critical debate on these ideas in philosophy has so far remained
at some distance from relevant empirical studies. But claims about
extended mind and distributed cognition, if they are to deserve wider
acceptance, must both make sense of and, in turn, inform work in the
cognitive and social sciences. Is the notion of extended or
distributed remembering consistent with the findings of empirical
memory research? Can such a view of memory usefully inform empirical
work, suggesting further areas of productive enquiry or helping to
make sense of existing findings?
This special issue will bring together supporters and critics of
extended and distributed cognition, to consider memory as a test case
for evaluating and further developing these hypotheses. Submitted
papers should thus address both memory and distributed cognition/
extended mind: ideally, papers should aim simultaneously to make
contributions to relevant debates in both philosophy and psychology or
other relevant empirical fields. While primarily theoretical papers
are welcome, they should make direct contact with empirical findings.
Similarly, while empirically-oriented papers might draw on evidence
from a range of areas, including the cognitive psychology of
transactive memory and collaborative recall, cognitive anthropology
and cognitive ethnography, science studies and the philosophy of
science, the history of memory practices, and the cognitive
archaeology of material culture, they should seek to advance the
theoretical debate over extended mind and distributed cognition,
rather than simply presenting findings from these fields.
Potential topics include (but are not limited to):
Relations between biological memory and external memory
How do forms of representation and storage in neural and external
memory differ, and why do such differences matter? Can theories of
distributed cognition deal with the existence of multiple memory
systems? For example, does the expert deployment of exograms in
certain external symbol systems affect working memory? How might the
development and operation of distributed memory systems affect neural
memory processes? Is evidence for neuroplasticity relevant for
assessing claims about distributed remembering? Given plausible links
between memory and self, what might distributed memory systems imply
about identity and agency? What happens when distributed memory
systems fail or break down?
How do distributed memory systems work?
What is socially distributed remembering, and does it offer any
support to revived ideas about group cognition, or to a naturalized
understanding of collective memory? Can theories of extended or
distributed cognition encompass socially distributed remembering in
addition to artifacts and other forms of memory scaffolding? What are
the implications of experimental studies of collaborative recall and
transactive memory for theories of distributed cognition? How do such
theories deal with memory practices and rituals, and with the roles of
the non-symbolic material environment?
Distributed memory and embodied cognition
How central in theories of extended or distributed memory should be
the study of skill acquisition and of expertise in the deployment of
external resources? What accounts of embodied skills, procedural
memory, and smooth or absorbed coping are required to support such
theories? How do distributed memory systems work in specific contexts
of embodied interaction, from conversation to music, dance,
performance, and sport?
Guest authors
The issue will include invited articles authored by:
Robert Rupert, University of Colorado (Boulder)
Deborah Tollefsen, University of Memphis, and Rick Dale, University of California (Merced)
Mike Wheeler, University of Stirling
Important dates
Submission deadline: July 15, 2012
Target publication date: December 15, 2012
How to submit
Prospective authors should register at: www.editorialmanager.com/ropp
to obtain a login and select Distributed cognition and memory research
as an article type. Manuscripts should be approximately 6,000 words.
Submissions should follow the author guidelines available on the
journal's website.
About the journal
The Review of Philosophy and Psychology (ISSN: 1878-5158; eISSN:
1878-5166) is a peer-reviewed journal published quarterly by Springer
and focusing on philosophical and foundational issues in cognitive
science. The aim of the journal is to provide a forum for discussion
on topics of mutual interest to philosophers and psychologists and to
foster interdisciplinary research at the crossroads of philosophy and
the sciences of the mind, including the neural, behavioural and social
sciences. The journal publishes theoretical works grounded in
empirical research as well as empirical articles on issues of
philosophical relevance. It includes thematic issues featuring invited
contributions from leading authors together with articles answering a
call for paper.
Contact
For any queries, please email the guest editors:
kmichaelian@bilkent.edu.tr, john.sutton@mq.edu.au
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