So, the putative problem for Clark is that he says that the machinery of the mind literally extends, but machinery is metaphorical. "What is “the machinery of the mind”? Obviously it’s a metaphor: not only is the mind not literally mechanical; the brain isn’t either. " I don't see the other commentators buying the charge of metaphor. But, ok, so why not simply charitably interpret Clark in a non-metaphorical way? (I know it's strange reading me defending Clark, but there you have it.)
The putative problem for Adams and me is, well, ... I'm not sure. Robinson attributes to me views I don't recognize.
1) if nothing material extends, mind doesn’t extend.
I am not sure what this means or why Robinson attributes this to me.2) Speaking a language doesn’t help us think?
Speaking a language might help us think. There is probably some sense to be made of that, but I don't see where I've committed to this one way or the other.3) Thinking itself isn’t a form of internalized conversation, steeped in transcraniality?
I don't believe that thinking itself is a form of internalized conversation, but I'm not sure where I've committed to this.4) Speech acts aren’t performed by whole groups?
I do think speech acts are, at least some times, performed by whole groups. But, I don't know how Robinson comes to the view that I deny that speech acts are performed by whole groups.So, it seems to me that Robinson is not being very charitable to either Clark or me.
