Vaesen re: Kelp and Greco

Here in Erkenntnis.

Hass on the Muller-Lyer II

Further, the fact that I have to construct my fully determinate figure, implies the correctness of Merleau-Ponty's different, better interpretation of the Muller-Lyer illusion: that perceptual indeterminacy is ontologically basic, that things such as ambiguity, illusions, and mirages, are fundamental aspects of the perceptual synergy out ofwhich our so-called "objective" constructions are built."
Lawrence Hass. Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy (p. 38-9). Kindle Edition. 

So, here are three claims Hass makes above:
1) I have to construct the fully determinate figure.
2) Perceptual indeterminacy is ontologically basic.
3) Things such as ambiguity, illusions, and mirages are fundamental aspects of the perceptual synergy out of which our so-called "objective" constructions are built.

I  don't see how 1) implies 2) or 3).  Of course, there is the obvious missing premise one could supply, "If I have to construct the fully determinate figure, then perceptual indeterminacy is ontologically basic."  But, I don't see why this conditional is plausible.

I'm not even sure I understand 3).  It's at least plausible to me that ambiguity, illusions and mirages are fundamental aspects of the perceptual synergy.  But, I'm not quite getting the part about our so-called "objective" constructions being built out of what?  Ambiguities, illusions, mirages?  The perceptual synergy?

Loughlin reviews Rowlands' New Science of the Mind

Here in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.

Hass on the Muller-Lyer

It is not unusual to see writers use this illusion to conclude that perception is a merely subjective event: "The two lines appear to be different lengths, when objectively they are the same; therefore, perception is subjective appearance, which hides objective reality." This reasoning is specious, common though it may be. Just because one can construct (with a ruler) some numerically determinate figure that we perceive indeterminately, does not entail the ontological claim that fundamental reality is a collection of fully determinate objects and perception a mere subjective appearance.
Lawrence Hass. Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy (pp. 37-38). Kindle Edition. 

Maybe some readers can help me with the foregoing passage.  So, I'm willing to entertain the view that this reasoning in the quotation is specious and that perception is not subjective appearance.

And, I agree that just because one can construct (with a ruler) some numerically determinate figure that we perceive indeterminately, does not entail the ontological claim that fundamental reality is a collection of fully determinate objects and that perception is a mere subjective appearance.

I also agree that just because one can construct (with a ruler) some numerically determinate figure that we perceive indeterminately, does not entail the ontological claim that fundamental reality is a collection of fully determinate objects.

But, I don't see how the view of perception is supposed to be linked to the theory of fundamental reality.  (I would have thought that all one needs is that appearance differs from reality. ) How is this supposed to work?  Honest question.

Farina's Review of Sterelny's The Evolved Apprentice

Pre-pub (?) version here.  The review will appear in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.

Consciousness in Interaction

There are some extended/embodied sorts of things in this forthcoming volume.

• Do sensory substitution devices extend the conscious mind?,  Julian Kiverstein and Mirko Farina  
• The extended mind and the boundaries of perception and action, Nivedita Gangopadhyay  
• Showtime at the Cartesian Theater? Vehicle externalism and dynamical explanations, Michael Madary  
• Is the function of consciousness to act as an interface?, Bryony Pierce  
• Es are good: Cognition as enacted, embodied, embedded, affective and extended, Dave Ward and Mog Stapleton

Maybe there are other 4E papers in here.  Apologies for any I have omitted.

Alas, nothing by me.....

Julian Kiverstein's "The Meaning of Embodiment" in TiCS

E-text available here.

Extended Knowledge at Edinburgh

Duncan Pritchard had mentioned to me that they had received a large grant for this.  Now some details are available here.  Pretty impressive.  Congratulations to Duncan, Andy Clark, and Jesper Kallustrup!!

Ryan's Forthcoming Review of Shapiro's Embodied Cognition

Text here.

Zebrowski's Review of Menary (Ed.) The Extended Mind

Download from Philosophical Psychology available here.