O’Regan, J. K. (2011). Why Red Doesn’t Sounds Like a Bell: Understanding the feel of consciousness. New York, NY: Oxford University Press
(H/T to Tom Froese at Life and Mind Seminars.)
Tuesday, May 31, 2011
May Travels
It's impressive what Apple's iMovie and Garage Band will let someone with zero talent (like me) do. But, I think the novelty of this wears off pretty quickly.
I got to do what is, for me, a lot of traveling. But, it's nothing to compared Colin Allen's 15 cities in 9 countries on four continents and two planets this semester.
I had hoped to get back to more blogging this June, but I am not sure, since I have a very full writing schedule for the summer. Anyway, after a nice Memorial Day with the kids and grandkids, it's back to nose to the grindstone.
Saturday, May 28, 2011
Group Photo from the Computation, Realization, and the Brain Workshop
Thanks to Eli Dresner, Oron Shagrir, and Maya Zuckerman for putting this workshop together! Excellent papers, good people, and a stunning venue.
Zednik: Mental Mechanisms and the Extended Mind
Carlos Zednik
Indiana University Cognitive Science Program
June 2010
Abstract:
Robert Rupert (2004) challenges the Extended Mind Hypothesis on the grounds that it appears to undermine the viability and productivity of cognitive science. In this paper, I respond to Rupert’s challenge by questioning his construal of cognitive scientific practice. Although the Extended Mind Hypothesis may in fact threaten the viability of a cognitive science that seeks the discovery of law‐like generalizations, cognitive scientists typically seek to describe the mechanisms that underlie such generalizations. By acknowledging the role of mechanistic explanation in contemporary cognitive scientific practice, I argue that the Extended Mind Hypothesis presents no threat to our current and future understanding of mind and cognition.
New book by Georg Theiner
Res Cogitans Extensa: A Philosophical Defense of the Extended Mind Thesis.
Georg will also be moving to Villanova this summer to start teaching next year.
Well done, Georg, and glad to have you back stateside.
Georg will also be moving to Villanova this summer to start teaching next year.
Well done, Georg, and glad to have you back stateside.
Tuesday, May 24, 2011
The Embodiment of Life: The Legacy of Francisco Varela
A conference at City University London, Wednesday June 1, in the Birley Lecture Theatre of the Centenary Building.
Description:
Francisco Varela was one of the most innovative and influential cognitive scientists of the last 50 years. His unique ability to blend deep knowledge of neuroscience, European philosophy and Tibetan Buddhism has had a profound affect on our understanding of the immune system, embodied cognition, and the relationship between brain and consciousness. To mark the 10th anniversary of his untimely death, this symposium brings together some of those who knew Francisco and explores the way his work continues to guide investigations of human nature of many different kinds.
Among those taking part will be Stephen Batchelor (Buddhist teacher), Michel Bitbol (Philosopher), Paul Bourgine (Engineer), John Protevi (Philosopher) and Antonino Raffone (Neuroscientist).
(From John Protevi's post at New APPS)
Menary to Macquarie
Congrats to Richard on his taking up a post July 1, 2011 at Macquarie University in the Centre for Cognition and its Disorders and the Department of Philosophy.
Thursday, May 19, 2011
Special Issue on Extended Mind in Teorema
Table of contents here.
Thanks to Leslie Marsh for posting a link.
Á. GARCÍA RODRÍGUEZ
An Extended View of Mind and and Cognition
An Extended View of Mind and and Cognition
T. BITTNER
Parity Cuts Both Ways: Split Brains and Extended Cognition
Parity Cuts Both Ways: Split Brains and Extended Cognition
J. KIVERSTEIN and M. FARINA
Embraining Culture: Leaky Minds and Spongy Brains
Embraining Culture: Leaky Minds and Spongy Brains
R. MANZOTTI
The Spread Mind: is Consciousness Situated?
The Spread Mind: is Consciousness Situated?
J. PARTHEMORE
Of Boundaries and Metaphysical Starting Points: Why the Extended Mind Cannot Be So Lightly Dismissed
Of Boundaries and Metaphysical Starting Points: Why the Extended Mind Cannot Be So Lightly Dismissed
L. MCKINNELL
We Are the World: Environmental Rights and the Extended Self
We Are the World: Environmental Rights and the Extended Self
G. VICARI
The Self Between Vehicle Externalism and the Myth of the Cartesian Theatre
The Self Between Vehicle Externalism and the Myth of the Cartesian Theatre
Thanks to Leslie Marsh for posting a link.
Sunday, May 8, 2011
Friday, May 6, 2011
COGS Seminar, University of Sussex
University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9QN
Tuesday May 10, 4pm Pevensey I, Room 1A7
Perception, Action, and the Extended Mind
Professor Mike Wheeler
School of Arts and Humanities: Philosophy
University of Stirling\
Abstract
According to the extended cognition hypothesis (henceforth ExC), there are actual (in-this-world) cases in which thinking and thoughts (more precisely, the material vehicles that realize thinking and thoughts) are spatially distributed over brain, body and world, in such a way that the external (beyond-the-skin) factors concerned are rightly accorded cognitive status (where 'cognitive status' signals whatever status it is that we ordinarily grant the brain in orthodox, non-extended cognitive theory). David Chalmers, one of the original architects of ExC, has recently articulated an objection to the view which turns on the claim that the idea of cognitive extension is in conflict with an intuitive thought that we ought to preserve. Chalmers puts that intuitive thought like this: 'It is natural to hold that perception is the interface where the world affects the mind, and that action is the interface where the mind affects the world. If so, it is tempting to hold that what precedes perception and what follows action is not truly mental.' Chalmers proceeds to offer a defence of ExC against the worry. In my talk I'll (i) set the scene with some comments about how one ought to understand ExC (comments that involve some criticisms of Andy Clark's version of the view), (ii) explain Chalmers' objection and his response to it, (iii) argue that Chalmers' response fails, and (iv) suggest that we should solve the problem by ditching the intuitive thought. This final move will enable me to address a challenge that, up until now, has arguably not been met successfully by advocates of ExC, that is, to say what consequences the view has for empirical work in cognitive science and psychology.
Mike Wheeler is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Stirling. Prior to joining Stirling Philosophy in 2004, he held teaching and research posts at the Universities of Dundee, Oxford, and Stirling (a previous appointment). His doctoral work was carried out in the School of Cognitive and Computing Sciences at the University of Sussex. His primary research interests are in philosophy of science (especially cognitive science, psychology, biology, artificial intelligence and artificial life) and philosophy of mind. He also works on Heidegger and is interested in exploring ideas at the interface between the analytic and the contemporary European traditions in philosophy. His book, Reconstructing the Cognitive World: the Next Step, was published by MIT Press in 2005.
Messages to the list are archived at http://listserv.liv.ac.uk/archives/philos-l.html.
Prolonged discussions should be moved to chora: enrol via
http://listserv.liv.ac.uk/archives/chora.html.
Other philosophical resources on the Web can be found at http://www.liv.ac.uk/pal.
Tuesday May 10, 4pm Pevensey I, Room 1A7
Perception, Action, and the Extended Mind
Professor Mike Wheeler
School of Arts and Humanities: Philosophy
University of Stirling\
Abstract
According to the extended cognition hypothesis (henceforth ExC), there are actual (in-this-world) cases in which thinking and thoughts (more precisely, the material vehicles that realize thinking and thoughts) are spatially distributed over brain, body and world, in such a way that the external (beyond-the-skin) factors concerned are rightly accorded cognitive status (where 'cognitive status' signals whatever status it is that we ordinarily grant the brain in orthodox, non-extended cognitive theory). David Chalmers, one of the original architects of ExC, has recently articulated an objection to the view which turns on the claim that the idea of cognitive extension is in conflict with an intuitive thought that we ought to preserve. Chalmers puts that intuitive thought like this: 'It is natural to hold that perception is the interface where the world affects the mind, and that action is the interface where the mind affects the world. If so, it is tempting to hold that what precedes perception and what follows action is not truly mental.' Chalmers proceeds to offer a defence of ExC against the worry. In my talk I'll (i) set the scene with some comments about how one ought to understand ExC (comments that involve some criticisms of Andy Clark's version of the view), (ii) explain Chalmers' objection and his response to it, (iii) argue that Chalmers' response fails, and (iv) suggest that we should solve the problem by ditching the intuitive thought. This final move will enable me to address a challenge that, up until now, has arguably not been met successfully by advocates of ExC, that is, to say what consequences the view has for empirical work in cognitive science and psychology.
Mike Wheeler is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Stirling. Prior to joining Stirling Philosophy in 2004, he held teaching and research posts at the Universities of Dundee, Oxford, and Stirling (a previous appointment). His doctoral work was carried out in the School of Cognitive and Computing Sciences at the University of Sussex. His primary research interests are in philosophy of science (especially cognitive science, psychology, biology, artificial intelligence and artificial life) and philosophy of mind. He also works on Heidegger and is interested in exploring ideas at the interface between the analytic and the contemporary European traditions in philosophy. His book, Reconstructing the Cognitive World: the Next Step, was published by MIT Press in 2005.
Messages to the list are archived at http://listserv.liv.ac.uk/archives/philos-l.html.
Prolonged discussions should be moved to chora: enrol via
http://listserv.liv.ac.uk/archives/chora.html.
Other philosophical resources on the Web can be found at http://www.liv.ac.uk/pal.
Ph.D. Research Fellowship (2 Positions) in Philosophy
Marie Curie Initial Training Network Ph.D. Fellowship Positions University of Hertfordshire, UK ‘TESIS’ (Towards and Embodied Science of Intersubjectivity)
The University of Hertfordshire is inviting applications for 2 Ph.D. fellowship positions in philosophy to join 15 other bright, highly motivated graduate students and postdocs at the network universities in Europe, to do interdisciplinary empirical and conceptual research on topics that involve intersubjectivity and social cognition.
TESIS – Towards an Embodied Science of InterSubjectivity – is an integrated ITN programme to investigate the foundations of human sociality. It integrates the complementary expertise of 13 European research institutes, clinical centres and private enterprises from the fields of philosophy, cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology and psychiatry/psychosomatics to advance our understanding of human intersubjectivity. Its major goal is to replace the static, individualistic paradigm still dominant in social cognition research with a comprehensive framework for embodied intersubjectivity applicable in the biomedical sciences, the humanities, and society in general. Thus, it intends to show how we become human by embodied interaction with others from early infancy.
Starting date for the positions is 01 October 2011.
The TESIS research group at Hertfordshire will investigate (1) enactive and extended cognition in social institutional contexts and (2) embodied approaches to cultural expression and intersubjective experience.
The TESIS program offers rich opportunities for interdisciplinary theoretical and empirical research. The fellows will participate actively in an international training network with expertise in the investigation of intersubjectivity and embodiment. This network is funded by the European Commission FP7 and provides ideal research and training opportunities during a three-year training programme consisting of high impact workshops, summer schools and conferences.
Please make your application online at http://www.herts.ac.uk/jobs/ (under Research Vacancies). Closing date for applications: May 31, 2011.
International applications welcome. Note: Candidates should have a
good command of English. To encourage mobility, successful candidates may
have spent at most 12 out of the last 36 months in the UK before
appointment. Qualified women are especially encouraged to apply.
Informal inquiries to
Professor Shaun Gallagher: gallaghr33@gmail.com or
Professor Daniel D. Hutto: d.d.hutto@herts.ac.uk
The University of Hertfordshire is inviting applications for 2 Ph.D. fellowship positions in philosophy to join 15 other bright, highly motivated graduate students and postdocs at the network universities in Europe, to do interdisciplinary empirical and conceptual research on topics that involve intersubjectivity and social cognition.
TESIS – Towards an Embodied Science of InterSubjectivity – is an integrated ITN programme to investigate the foundations of human sociality. It integrates the complementary expertise of 13 European research institutes, clinical centres and private enterprises from the fields of philosophy, cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology and psychiatry/psychosomatics to advance our understanding of human intersubjectivity. Its major goal is to replace the static, individualistic paradigm still dominant in social cognition research with a comprehensive framework for embodied intersubjectivity applicable in the biomedical sciences, the humanities, and society in general. Thus, it intends to show how we become human by embodied interaction with others from early infancy.
Starting date for the positions is 01 October 2011.
The TESIS research group at Hertfordshire will investigate (1) enactive and extended cognition in social institutional contexts and (2) embodied approaches to cultural expression and intersubjective experience.
The TESIS program offers rich opportunities for interdisciplinary theoretical and empirical research. The fellows will participate actively in an international training network with expertise in the investigation of intersubjectivity and embodiment. This network is funded by the European Commission FP7 and provides ideal research and training opportunities during a three-year training programme consisting of high impact workshops, summer schools and conferences.
Please make your application online at http://www.herts.ac.uk/jobs/ (under Research Vacancies). Closing date for applications: May 31, 2011.
International applications welcome. Note: Candidates should have a
good command of English. To encourage mobility, successful candidates may
have spent at most 12 out of the last 36 months in the UK before
appointment. Qualified women are especially encouraged to apply.
Informal inquiries to
Professor Shaun Gallagher: gallaghr33@gmail.com or
Professor Daniel D. Hutto: d.d.hutto@herts.ac.uk
Tuesday, May 3, 2011
Postdoctoral Fellowship in the Network for Research on the Senses
Via the Mind Network blog ...
University of Toronto
The Network for Research on the Senses invites applications for one Post-Doctoral Fellowship. Applicants should have a PhD in philosophy, and research expertise in the philosophy of perception from a relevant scientific perspective. The Fellowship is open to citizens of all countries.
The Network for Research on the Senses is a partnership of philosophers of perception at Toronto (Mohan Matthen), London (Barry Smith), Harvard (Susanna Siegel), Glasgow (Fiona Macpherson), and MIT (Alex Byrne), funded by a Partnership Development Grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Over the next two academic years, the Network will conduct six interdisciplinary workshops on multimodal perception, relations between perception and cognition, the individuation of the senses, and other related topics. Teams of graduate students from the five institutions will report on these workshops; their summaries will form the basis of a web-forum to which all qualified researchers will have access.
The Fellow will have duties relating to the organization of the workshops, the supervision of graduate participation, and the editing of the web forum. This will involve travel to the workshops, and interaction with researchers in philosophy and other disciplines at the five partner institutions and elsewhere. The Fellow will thus gain valuable experience in the practice and administration of collaborative research activity. S/he will be expected to conduct an active program of research, and will have extensive access to the investigators named above and others at the partner institutions.
The Fellowship will be tenable for a two-year period in the Network Centre for Research in the Senses at the University of Toronto, Mississauga, beginning July or August 2011. The fellowship stipend is C$37,000 per year, with a $2,000 per annum personal research allowance.
Candidates who will receive their PhD degree by December 2011 are eligible to apply; however, they must submit a letter confirming their completion.
Applicants must submit the following materials in electronic form by June 1, 2011:
Carla DeMarco at car.demarco@utoronto.ca. Please put “Network PDF Application” in the subject line of the application.
See: http://philosophy.utoronto.ca/undergraduate/utm/continuously-posted-notices/post-doc%20ad.doc/view for more details
The Network for Research on the Senses invites applications for one Post-Doctoral Fellowship. Applicants should have a PhD in philosophy, and research expertise in the philosophy of perception from a relevant scientific perspective. The Fellowship is open to citizens of all countries.
The Network for Research on the Senses is a partnership of philosophers of perception at Toronto (Mohan Matthen), London (Barry Smith), Harvard (Susanna Siegel), Glasgow (Fiona Macpherson), and MIT (Alex Byrne), funded by a Partnership Development Grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Over the next two academic years, the Network will conduct six interdisciplinary workshops on multimodal perception, relations between perception and cognition, the individuation of the senses, and other related topics. Teams of graduate students from the five institutions will report on these workshops; their summaries will form the basis of a web-forum to which all qualified researchers will have access.
The Fellow will have duties relating to the organization of the workshops, the supervision of graduate participation, and the editing of the web forum. This will involve travel to the workshops, and interaction with researchers in philosophy and other disciplines at the five partner institutions and elsewhere. The Fellow will thus gain valuable experience in the practice and administration of collaborative research activity. S/he will be expected to conduct an active program of research, and will have extensive access to the investigators named above and others at the partner institutions.
The Fellowship will be tenable for a two-year period in the Network Centre for Research in the Senses at the University of Toronto, Mississauga, beginning July or August 2011. The fellowship stipend is C$37,000 per year, with a $2,000 per annum personal research allowance.
Candidates who will receive their PhD degree by December 2011 are eligible to apply; however, they must submit a letter confirming their completion.
Applicants must submit the following materials in electronic form by June 1, 2011:
- A letter of application, including a statement of current research interests (outlining the research to be undertaken during the term of fellowship).
- Curriculum vitae.
- The names of three referees.
- A writing sample, which may be published work, an extract from their dissertation, or a draft of work in progress (not to exceed 25 pages).
Carla DeMarco at car.demarco@utoronto.ca. Please put “Network PDF Application” in the subject line of the application.
See: http://philosophy.utoronto.ca/undergraduate/utm/continuously-posted-notices/post-doc%20ad.doc/view for more details
Philosophy and the Brain: Computation, Realization, Representation
This workshop at the Institute for Advanced Studies at the Hebrew University in a couple of weeks will be very nice.
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