Who thinks that, in addition to the intracranial cognition that has been studied in the past, there is also transcranial cognition that is "just like" intracranial cognition?
Given the Inga-Otto example, Clark probably should count as a defender of Supplementary EC. For Clark, the "just like" has to do with "sameness of functional poise", whatever that amounts to.
Mark Sprevak, in "Extended Cognition and Functionalism", also seems to support Supplementary EC. For Sprevak, the "just like" has to do with some "general categories of cognition", whatever that amounts to.
Justin Fisher, in his critical notice of Bounds, also seems to support Supplementary EC. For Fisher, like Sprevak, the "just like" has to do with some "general categories of cognition".
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