Di Paolo on Cognition and Sense Making

Earlier, I noted that, according to Di Paolo,

Only of the subset of autopoietic systems that are not just robust but also adaptive can we say that they possess operational mechanisms to potentially distinguish the different virtual implications of otherwise equally viable paths of encounters with the environment. (Di Paolo, 2009, p. 14).

But, this is followed immediately by this:

Only of the subset of autopoietic systems that are not just robust but also adaptive can we say that they posses operational mechanisms to potentially distinguish the different virtual implications of otherwise equally viable paths of encounters with the environment. This differential operation is called sense-making (Weber and Varela 2002; Di Paolo 2005; Thompson 2007). If, as proposed, sense-making requires the acquisition of ‘‘a valence which is dual at its basis: attraction or rejection, approach or escape’’(Weber and Varela 2002, p. 117), a system engaged in sense-making requires, apart from the norm given by self-construction, access to how it currently stands against the all-or-nothing barrier given by that norm.  (Di Paolo, 2009, pp. 14-15).

But, here it seems that sense-making requires more than just robustness and adaptivity.   The issue is that sense-making requires a valence, which does not seem to be guaranteed by having a robust, adaptive autopoeitic system.  The problem is that one might well have a system that can "possess operational mechanisms to potentially distinguish the different virtual implications of otherwise equally viable paths of encounters with the environment", yet have no valence about those different implications.

Di Paolo, E. (2009). Extended life. Topoi, 28(1), 9-21.