The second claim that Malafouris needs to establish is that when things-beyond-the-skin achieve the status of being essential to the enactment of, and partly constitutive of, certain cognitive systems or operations, they often do so in virtue of a kind of causal contribution that is, in some way to be determined, a product of those things’ essential materiality, rather than in virtue of some other kind of causal contribution. (Wheeler, forthcoming, p. 1).Draft of paper to appear in Renfrew C. and Malafouris L. (eds.), The Cognitive Life of Things: Recasting the Boundaries of the Mind, McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research Publications, Cambridge
Wednesday, June 9, 2010
Trust & Glue Versus Coupling "in the right way" 3
Ok. So, I could be wrong about the origins of the "in the right way" move. Wheeler, forthcoming, might have had this independently of Clark, 2008, and Wilson and Clark, 2009:
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
No comments:
Post a Comment