Now, if the theory of physics cannot be claimed to have monopoly on descriptions of "what is really there" , there is no longer any reason to assume that the perceptual systems must necessarily begin by registering what is basic to physics. On the contrary, we should expect perceptual mechanisms which directly register variables of high informational value to the perceiver. (Runeson, 1977, p. 173).This seems to me a rash argument. Grant that physics does not have a monopoly on reality. That there are things, such as say trees, that are not a part of physics narrowly construed. There still might be reason to believe (forget about "assuming") that perceptual systems begin by registering (set aside the "must necessarily") what is basic to physics (set aside quarks and think of photons). I mean, Runeson seems to assume that something like reductionism to physics is the only possible reason to think that vision science should begin with entities of physics.
So, for example, why couldn't there be some experimental result is psychology or neuroscience that supports the view that perceptual systems begin by registering what is basic to physics? By this, I take it that Runeson is not merely challenging the idea that vision science should begin with fundamental physical entities, such as quarks. I'm assuming that he would not like a vision science that begins with, say, photons. Why couldn't there be an experiment that shows that people respond to flashes of light or patterns of light. That really is the mainstream view of vision. EP folks think this; they just disagree with it.
Runeson, S. (2008). "On the possibility of "smart" perceptual mechanisms". Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, Volume 18, Issue 1, pages 172–179, September 1977