You're still failing to remember the issue of the scope of the ecological law which creates the specification relation. I know you think it's a red herring, but it's actually critical and was the entire point of TSRM. Without it, you are chasing a straw man; 'hey look, my incomplete notion of information means affordances aren't specified!'. Feel free to chase that straw man all you like, but it has no implications for ecological psychology.
There are also nonvisual affordances like olfactory affordances. I'm not sure what your point here is. An animal particularly attuned to salt could easily detect the information in the ambient energy fields specific to the affordance of eating-salt.
Gary, I'm challenging this: "And if there information in light for the perception of surfaces, is there information for the perception of what they afford? Perhaps the composition and layout of surfaces constitutes what they afford." (Gibson, 1979, p. 127).
Andrew, I'm not failing to remember. The thing about scope is indeed a red herring. Let me explain.
Suppose what you are saying is that these examples fall outside the scope of the putative laws. Fine. The theory doesn't work for these cases. So, the theory doesn't work because the examples fall outside the scope of the laws or it doesn't work because the examples do fall within the scope of the laws and the light doesn't specify the affordance. Bottom line: the theory doesn't work.
An animal particularly attuned to salt could easily detect the information in the ambient energy fields specific to the affordance of eating-salt.
Maybe it's true by some sort of definition that an animal particularly attuned to salt could easily detect the information. But, then, the thing to say is that humans do not appear to be such animals, at least with vision.
Andrew seems to think that there are multiple escape routes for the basic problem here. (The basic problem is that affordance typically don't structure ambient energy fields.) He's got the other sense modalities to fall back on, then scope, yada yada, yada. There's always another whistle or bell about why the examples don't work or why it doesn't matter. There is always more to obscure a simple point.
But, I'm trying to proceed systematically. Once you see how the story fails for vision, it's not so hard to see how it fails for other sense modalities as well.
So, I take it that olfaction is not going to enable you to perceive the pick-up-ability of the exploding boxes, their sit-on-ability, their stand-on-ability.
Forgetting scope means you are still asking an incomplete question: first, what animal are you talking about? Stairs afford climbing for a human, but not an elephant.
Also, the other perceptual systems aren't bells and whistles. Vision requires calibration from other modalities, and vice versa. These are no trivial concerns.
First, I'm not forgetting scope. Second, I've always been talking about humans picking up, standing on, etc. The problem remains: The surfaces of things typically do not structure light in such a way as to specify affordances for humans.
Yes, really. You asked 'is this edible?'. That's the wrong question. If you want to talk about affordances you might as well do it properly - this is how you do it.
First, you have to define your task space properly, part of which is answering 'edible by what?' Then you need to run the experiment; take your, say, person, and see if they try to eat this. If they do, you then need to investigate the information; maybe a learning study, or a perturbation study, depending on the practical aspects of what you think the information is.
The fact that you think these questions are irrelevant is why I keep reminding you about information and scope; because you are wrong to think these are irrelevant, mere bells and whistles, etc. As I said at the start, all you're doing just now is beating up on a straw man.
You cant' have figured out the answer from the foregoing?
First, I'm not forgetting scope. Second, I've always been talking about humans picking up, standing on, etc. The problem remains: The surfaces of things typically do not structure light in such a way as to specify affordances for humans.
Are you serious? I don't take your question seriously because the answer is completely obvious.
Of course I can work it out. What I'm saying is that you need to specify it in your question for the question to be of any use. Then you can run the study and find out whether people can do the task, then you can try and figure out how, etc etc. You're simply taking the answer for granted because you think it's obvious; it is, however, still an open empirical question.
The question 'is it edible' is meaningless. The question has to be 'is it edible by a human' because that's different that 'is it edible by a shark'. What I'm trying to say is that, if you want to pose this type of question, you have to be specific.
You're still failing to remember the issue of the scope of the ecological law which creates the specification relation. I know you think it's a red herring, but it's actually critical and was the entire point of TSRM. Without it, you are chasing a straw man; 'hey look, my incomplete notion of information means affordances aren't specified!'. Feel free to chase that straw man all you like, but it has no implications for ecological psychology.
ReplyDeleteThere are also nonvisual affordances like olfactory affordances. I'm not sure what your point here is. An animal particularly attuned to salt could easily detect the information in the ambient energy fields specific to the affordance of eating-salt.
ReplyDeleteGary,
ReplyDeleteI'm challenging this: "And if there information in light for the perception of surfaces, is there information for the perception of what they afford? Perhaps the composition and layout of surfaces constitutes what they afford." (Gibson, 1979, p. 127).
Andrew, I'm not failing to remember. The thing about scope is indeed a red herring. Let me explain.
ReplyDeleteSuppose what you are saying is that these examples fall outside the scope of the putative laws. Fine. The theory doesn't work for these cases. So, the theory doesn't work because the examples fall outside the scope of the laws or it doesn't work because the examples do fall within the scope of the laws and the light doesn't specify the affordance. Bottom line: the theory doesn't work.
An animal particularly attuned to salt could easily detect the information in the ambient energy fields specific to the affordance of eating-salt.
ReplyDeleteMaybe it's true by some sort of definition that an animal particularly attuned to salt could easily detect the information. But, then, the thing to say is that humans do not appear to be such animals, at least with vision.
Andrew seems to think that there are multiple escape routes for the basic problem here. (The basic problem is that affordance typically don't structure ambient energy fields.) He's got the other sense modalities to fall back on, then scope, yada yada, yada. There's always another whistle or bell about why the examples don't work or why it doesn't matter. There is always more to obscure a simple point.
ReplyDeleteBut, I'm trying to proceed systematically. Once you see how the story fails for vision, it's not so hard to see how it fails for other sense modalities as well.
So, I take it that olfaction is not going to enable you to perceive the pick-up-ability of the exploding boxes, their sit-on-ability, their stand-on-ability.
Forgetting scope means you are still asking an incomplete question: first, what animal are you talking about? Stairs afford climbing for a human, but not an elephant.
ReplyDeleteAlso, the other perceptual systems aren't bells and whistles. Vision requires calibration from other modalities, and vice versa. These are no trivial concerns.
First, I'm not forgetting scope. Second, I've always been talking about humans picking up, standing on, etc. The problem remains: The surfaces of things typically do not structure light in such a way as to specify affordances for humans.
ReplyDeleteI thought this post was about edibility.Edible by what?
ReplyDeleteReally?
ReplyDeleteYes, really. You asked 'is this edible?'. That's the wrong question. If you want to talk about affordances you might as well do it properly - this is how you do it.
ReplyDeleteFirst, you have to define your task space properly, part of which is answering 'edible by what?' Then you need to run the experiment; take your, say, person, and see if they try to eat this. If they do, you then need to investigate the information; maybe a learning study, or a perturbation study, depending on the practical aspects of what you think the information is.
The fact that you think these questions are irrelevant is why I keep reminding you about information and scope; because you are wrong to think these are irrelevant, mere bells and whistles, etc. As I said at the start, all you're doing just now is beating up on a straw man.
You cant' have figured out the answer from the foregoing?
ReplyDeleteFirst, I'm not forgetting scope. Second, I've always been talking about humans picking up, standing on, etc. The problem remains: The surfaces of things typically do not structure light in such a way as to specify affordances for humans.
Are you serious? I don't take your question seriously because the answer is completely obvious.
Of course I can work it out. What I'm saying is that you need to specify it in your question for the question to be of any use. Then you can run the study and find out whether people can do the task, then you can try and figure out how, etc etc. You're simply taking the answer for granted because you think it's obvious; it is, however, still an open empirical question.
ReplyDeleteWhat I'm saying is that I don't need to specify it in my question, since anyone can figure it out.
ReplyDeleteThe question 'is it edible' is meaningless. The question has to be 'is it edible by a human' because that's different that 'is it edible by a shark'. What I'm trying to say is that, if you want to pose this type of question, you have to be specific.
ReplyDeleteAnyone who is genuinely interested can figure out the ellipsis.
ReplyDelete