Ross & Ladyman's "Alleged Coupling-Constitution Fallacy" 3

In the last post, I noted Ross & Ladyman seem to think that we should look to actual scientific practice to determine what one should believe.

The idea that there might be a justified general such claim about all cognitive models, which could rationally be made in advance of tackling specific modeling problems one at a time (Ross & Ladyman, 2010, p. 156).

Now, from this one might think that Ross and Ladyman think that the proper basis for making justified general claims about all cognitive models would be to look at the results of specific cognitive modeling problems.  But, that's not right.  Instead, they think the proper basis would be to look at the results of modeling in mature sciences, such as fundamental physics.

And, again, Rupert, Adams, and Aizawa suppose that they are not trying to justify their views in advance of tacking specific scientific problems. They try to justify their views by appeal to actual scientific practice.  It's the advocates of EC who sometimes want to appeal to something other than actual scientific practice.