Ross, Ladyman, and "Metaphysical Hunches"

As is typical of philosophers promoting metaphysical hunches, Adams and Aizawa (2001) explicitly associate the internalist view with "common sense,"

I'm probably as much against "metaphysical hunches" as are 70% of philosophers, but I don't think that "common sense" must only be a reflection of prejudice, thoughtlessness, or metaphysical hunches.  I think the idea that mental or cognitive processes take place in the brain is supported by certain relatively informal experiences with injuries in battle.  (I've posted a sketchy speculative description of his idea here.)  It's a kind of defeasible empirical conjecture (that I happen to think is also reinforced by more rigorous scientific work) and not a mere metaphysical hunch. The conjecture could be false, but it would still be a false a posteriori, empirical conjecture.