One of the challenging features of coming to grips with the hypothesis of extended cognition is sifting through the many ambiguous claims that appear in the literature. The most familiar, of course, is the claim that cognitive processes depend on bodily and environmental processes. Is this dependence constitutive, as the EC folks maintain, or merely causal, as Rupert, Adams, Aizawa, and others maintain?
The term "cognitive resource" has an ambiguity as well. This can be brought out through the parallel case of "computational resource". In a dual core processor of a standard desktop computer, each processor would be a computational resources and both would realize computational processing. Computational processes take place in both CPUs. But, note that the hard disk of a standard desktop computer is also a computational resource, but it is not one in which computational processes take place. The process of computation takes place in the CPU(s). So, you can have a computational resource in which computation does not take place, but which is merely a tool for the bona fide computational processes in the CPU.
So, return to the case of a cognitive resource. The question is what kind of cognitive resource is, say, the non-neural parts of the body? Are the non-neural parts of the body a cognitive resource in which cognitive processing takes place (as in the parallel case of a dual core processor) or are they cognitive resources that are mere tools for the bona fide cognitive processes in the brain (as in the parallel case of the computer's hard disk)? This is yet another way of getting at what is at issue in the EC debate. The use of the phrase "cognitive resource" threatens to mask the issue.