At times it may seem that Gibson accepted static-view ambiguity (e.g., 1966. pp. 198-199) and even gave nodding recognition to the reasonableness of the invocation of assumptions (Gibson, 1979, p. 167). However, it would be wrong to take this as his definite position on static information. A circumspect reading reveals that Gibson's admissions of static-view ambiguity were of a temporary nature, made in the context of his all-out war against the dogma of universal equivocality in proximal patterns. Because, strictly speaking, the demonstration of a single counter instance would decide the basic issue in his favor, there is a premium in giving priority to nonstatic conditions, in which case specificity is less difficult to demonstrate (Runeson, 1988, p. 298)."dogma of universal equivocality"? "the demonstration of a single counter instance would decide the basic issue in his favor"? It seems that Gibson and Runeson are near the other extreme claiming that there is no ambiguity at all.
Personally, it seems a more middle of the road view that there is some ambiguity sometimes is a pretty likely view. And, if that is true, then it seems as though we would need a vision science framework that hypothesizes something like "presuppositions". That was what I was driving at in trying to find out what Gibsonians say about static viewing of the Ames Room.