Sunday, January 30, 2011

A Note on Merritt's Abstract

As Adams and Aizawa (2008), e.g., have suggested, cognitive processes trade in non-derived content and a couple system of the sort Clark and Chalmers (1998) envision could never be characterized in this manner.
Now, this is technically not the A&A view.  We do not maintain that a coupled system could never be said to have non-derived content.  It's just that, as a matter of contingent empirical fact, this does not typically happen.  We are not claiming that extracranial non-derived content or extended cognition is impossible.

But, I don't see that this technicality is crucial to Merritt's overall argument.

2 comments:

  1. Since the derived-nonderived distinction is so critical in this debate, I'd like to better understand it - in particular, get at least a rough idea of which side of that line various activities fall.

    Presumably, quotidian speech falls comfortably over on the derived (D) side. And truly original thoughts (theory of relativity, incompleteness theorem) also comfortably over on the ND side. So, what about the kind of thinking we mere mortals do when discussing ideas like EC vs non-EC? Speaking for myself, it's inconceivable that I would ever utter anything legitimately called ND. OTOH, the material is decidedly non-quotidian. So, where are we right now?

    Dropping down a level or two, how about recognizing objects. Sellars calls that kind of activity a "linguistic affair", which suggests that that too is D. And if one defines "perception" so as to require recognition of objects, it too becomes D.

    And skills. Now that seems like something that in many instances one could develop independently. So is that ND?

    Which seems to leave ND to the occasional genius, in which case it would be mostly irrelevant, or to those engaged in what we often refer to as "mindless" behavior, which seems paradoxical. So, where am I going wrong?

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  2. ND is content non-derived from antecendently meaningful things. I take it that all thought has ND content; English expressions have D content.

    Presumably, quotidian speech falls comfortably over on the derived (D) side. And truly original thoughts (theory of relativity, incompleteness theorem) also comfortably over on the ND side. So, what about the kind of thinking we mere mortals do when discussing ideas like EC vs non-EC?

    This seems to go back to the stuff about "thinking in English" that Menary was on about. I take it that thinking in English is a matter of there being mentalese representations of sentences in English.

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