I will call arguments like this Hegelian arguments. Specifically, Hegelian arguments are arguments, based on little or no empirical evidence, to the conclusion that some scientific approach ... will fail. (Chemero, 2009, p. 7).So, that's what a Hegelian argument is and here is what one looks like:
So, on the Turvey-Shaw-Mace view, either babies do not perceive their mothers (because the information for direct perception is unavailable) or they do not perceive them directly. I take it that either alternative is unacceptable to radical embodied cognitive scientists. (Chemero, 2009, pp. 112-3).This looks to me like an argument based on little or no empirical evidence to the conclusion that some scientific approach will fail. Now, one might say "But, Ken asking for empirical evidence that babies perceive their mothers is like asking for empirical evidence that dogs have tails." (Cf., Chemero, 2009, p. 210, fn, 7) But, maybe the thing to say is that one should be able to demand evidence for any empirical premise in an argument.
But, enough of ribbing Tony. The more serious reply, I think, is that Chemero would seem to me to beg the question against TSM. I thought their view is that one perceives affordances, rather than objects. So, rather than seeing chairs, we see sit-on-ables. So, by extension, it would seem that TSM would deny that one perceives Ken Aizawa; instead, one might perceive "argue-with-able" or "slap-in-the-faceable".
I happen to agree that we perceive objects and individuals, but I would want to give an empifical argument for that, given that TSM seem to disagree with me on that.