To sum up, The New Science of the Mind is in my view an uneven book. The first part is a brief and useful introduction to the philosophy of embodied, extended and enactive cognition. The second part is an excellent analysis of counterarguments to the embodied and extended mind (and their combination in the amalgamated mind), and an interesting response to these arguments via a plausible criterion of what counts as a cognitive process. As far as I know, critics of the extended mind (such as Fred Adams, Kenneth Aizawa or Robert Rupert) have not responded to Rowlands criterion (first presented in Rowlands 2009). It would be interesting to see what they make of it.I have written a reply to Rowlands, (2009), on this. It is in Aizawa, K. (2010). "The Coupling-Constitution Fallacy Revisited, (2010), Cognitive Systems Research, 11, (4), 332-342
And, actually, Mark and I talked about this in our discussion on Philosophy TV.