The irony, of course, is that Clark, and others, have taken to charging A&A with brain-o-centric bias.If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as aOn a strict interpretation this principle appears to measure cognition in
process which, were it to go on in the head, we would have no
hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then
that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive
process. (Clark and Chalmers 1998, p. 8)
terms of the Cartesian gold standard of what goes on in the head. It suggests
that a process outside of the head counts as cognitive only if in principle it
could be accomplished in the head (Gallagher, forthcoming, p. 1).
Clark (2008, p. 114) rejects this interpretation, insisting that theAnd, it's good to see them on the defensive on this.
parity principle should not be interpreted as requiring any similarity
between inner and outer processes. Wheeler (2006, 3) explains that the
parity principle does not “fix the benchmarks for what it is to count as a
proper part of a cognitive system by identifying all the details of the causal
contribution made by (say) the brain [and then by looking] to see if any
external elements meet those benchmarks.” (Gallagher, forthcoming, p. 2)