Kiverstein & Farina's and the Modal Version of Extended Cognition

NB: The posts on this paper that will follow in the coming days are all based on this late draft of the Kiverstein & Farina paper.  I've sent them these comments, so the final publication may or may not be different.  And, since Julian and Mirko read the blog (at least at times), they might appreciate some feedback.  Pile on or rise to their defense!

We will call the more general thesis that mental states can supervene on organised systems of processes and mechanisms that criss-cross the boundary of brain, body and world, the Extended Mind Thesis (EMT).  EMT would seem to be a thesis that any philosopher of mind committed to functionalism ought to sign up for.  For it looks to be a straightforward implication of the central tenet of functionalism that it is a state of mind’s causal role that makes it the type of state that it is. The biological and the artefactual can coalesce to realise a type of mental state, so long as they work together to make the right kinds of causal contribution in the initiation and guidance of successful purposeful behaviour.  Where the materials that make this causal contribution are located is not relevant, what is important is simply the job that these materials perform.  Often these jobs can be performed better when the biological agent works in partnership with resources located in the environment beyond the boundary of skin and skull.  (Kiverstein & Farina, forthcoming, p. 2)

Now, Rupert and A&A agree with EMT formulated this way: "mental states can supervene on organised systems of processes and mechanisms that criss-cross the boundary of brain, body and world, the Extended Mind Thesis (EMT). " (italics added).  This is a modal claim, which is to be distinguished from the non-modal claim that mental states supervene on organised systems of processes and mechanisms that criss-cross the boundary of brain, body and world.  Mike Wheeler has made this distinction pretty prominent in the manuscript for his current book.