EC is no joking matter

The second paper that Adams and I wrote on extended cognition began with the following:

Question: Why did the pencil think that 2 + 2 = 4?
Clark’s Answer: Because it was coupled to the mathematician.
 That about sums up what is wrong with Clark’s extended mind hypothesis.  (Adams and Aizawa, Forthcoming).

One can surely have one's doubts about the humor, but one unfortunate consequence of this has apparently been to suggest to others that we misunderstand EC.  Our misunderstanding is supposed to be that, according to EC, external objects alone are cognitive in virtue of coupling.  EC does not, so the reply goes, maintain this.  It is the brain + body + world that is supposed to be an extended cognitive system.  Or, it is processing the brain, body, and world that is supposed to be a cognitive routine. 

(Clark also supposes that it makes no sense to talk of objects, such as a pencil, being cognitive.)

Now, in truth, the aim of the story is to draw attention to the absurdity of coupling arguments, which is a principal topic of the paper.  But, it does not seem to me to be that bad a reading of the Inga-Otto thought experiment.  See the following:

Question: Why was the scrawl in the notebook a dispositional belief that MOMA is on 52rd St.?
Clark’s Answer: Because it was coupled to Otto.

Rowlands on the Rationale for EC

 In "Enactivism and the Extended Mind", Rowlands writes,

It is possible to understand EM as asserting a necessary truth about the composition of mental processes: that, necessarily, some mental processes are partly constituted by processes of environmental manipulation, etc. It is possible, but inadvisable. The underlying rationale for EM is provided by a liberal form of functionalism. And the entire thrust of liberal functionalism is to leave open the possibility of different ways of realizing the same (type of) mental process. By understanding EM as asserting a necessary truth, therefore, the proponent of EM is at risk of undermining his or her own primary motivation. (p. 54).

But, I don't think there is a consensus that "The underlying rationale for EM is provided by a liberal form of functionalism"  Liberal functionalism does not seem to be Haugeland's rationale for EC.  Nor does it seems to be Chemero's rationale for EC (his rationale being some combination of dynamical systems theory and Gibsonian ecological psychology).

Rowlands vs. Menary (Revolutionary EC)

In a recent paper, Rowlands claims that

It is possible to understand EM as asserting a necessary truth about the composition of mental processes: that, necessarily, some mental processes are partly constituted by processes of environmental manipulation, etc. It is possible, but inadvisable. (Rowlands, 2009b, p. 54)

But, this seems to be a direct assault on Revolutionary EC, as articulated by, for example, Menary:

The manipulation of external vehicles is importantly different from the manipulation of internal vehicles and their integration is the unit of cognitive analysis. We are not just coupling artifacts to pre-existing cognitive agents; the organism becomes a cognitive agent by being coupled to the external environment. (Menary, 2006, p. 342) 

It looks like Menary is defining cognition or offering a theory of what cognition is which makes it a necessary truth the cognition is extended.

Same goes if you read Clark and Chalmers as offering a definition, or theoretical account, of active externalism, (rather than a reason for it) in this passage:

We advocate a very different sort of externalism: an active externalism, based on the active role of the environment in driving cognitive processes (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 7)

Rowlands (2009) on Noë's Enactivism

Although I very often offer criticisms, it is nice to be able to draw attention to points of common ground with others in the EC literature.  In earlier posts, I noted some points of agreement between Rowlands and myself regarding such things as the need for a MotC and a target for the concept of cognition to be studied.  I am in fairly widespread agreement with almost everything in Rowlands (2009), but I want to draw attention to Rowlands' discussion of Noë's enactivism.  This brings out other points of agreement.

Rowlands identifies two distinct claims in Noë's enactivism

Visually perceiving the world is made up of two things: 

(1) Expectations about how our experience of an object will change in the event of our moving, or the object of our vision moving, relative to us (or some other
object moving with respect to that object—for example, in front of it). Noe¨ calls this sensorimotor knowledge or knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies.
When our expectations are correct, this is because we have mastered the relevant sensorimotor contingencies.
(2) The ability to act on the world—i.e., to probe and explore environmental structures by way of the visual modality. (p. 55).

Rowlands also distinguishes two versions of (2).  (2a), we might label it, claims that perceiving only requires an ability, where (2b) claims that perceiving requires the exercise of an ability.  (1) and (2a) come very close to being what I have called "weak enactivism", where (2b) is very close to "strong enactivism" (See my forthcoming "Consciousness: Don't Give up on the Brain" )  It's good to have some agreement on at least some of the options in Noë's view.

Rowlands and I also agree that (1) and (2a) do not support EC (Cf, Aizawa, 2007, pp. 17-18), but get to those conclusions by distinct arguments.  Rowlands and I also agree that (2b) is not very plausible, though we again get there by distinct arguments.

Noë on Mach's Picture

In Action in Perception, Noe writes,

Let us now ask, is it really the case that our experience represents the world in sharp focus, uniform detail, and brilliant color, from the center out to the periphery of the visual field, as Mach's picture would have it? ...
     It's pretty easy to demonstrate that this snapshot conception is wrong-headed.  Fix your gaze on a point straight ahead.  Have a friend wave a brightly colored piece of paper off to the side.  You'll immediately notice that something is moving in the periphery of your visual field, but you won't be able to tell what color it is.  As your friend to move the paper closer to the center of the visual field.  You won't be sure what color the paper is until it has been moved to within twenty to thirty degrees from the center.  This proves that we don't experience the periphery of our visual field in anything like the clarity, detail, or focus with which we can take in what we are directly looking at. (p. 49).

 I don't think this argument works.  (The Machian picture may be wrong, but this argument as it stands does not support that conclusion.)  Remember that the Machian picture is supposed to be about one's perceptual experience, not about, say, the relationship between the world and one's perceptual experience.  The view is that "our experience represents the world in sharp focus, uniform detail, and brilliant color, from the center out to the periphery of the visual field".  Now, it is perfectly possible for us to have this kind of experience by way of some mental representation without the putative representation of that experience being created using input from the periphery.  So, the reason you cannot tell the color of the paper when it is waved in the periphery is that you are not using color input (although definitely motion input) from the paper to create the putative mental representation of the periphery of you visual field. You are using other mechanisms to fill this out.  Which is, of course, just the kind of thing one typically postulates when one tries to explain the blindspot phenomena.

Special Issue of Topoi on Extended Cognition and Enactivism

Link here.

Maybe Topoi is a bit off the beaten path, so those interested in EC may not have heard of this special issue.  The nice thing is that these papers are available for free download. 

I've already written a few future posts on Rowlands paper...

Noë on Sur's Ferrets: Here's the picture(s)

Noë claims that "The character of conscious experience can vary even though the neural activity underpinning it does not change.  This is the basic lesson of Sur’s studies. "   (Noë, 2009, p. 54).  So, this is what Noë thinks the experiments show:

But, this is what they really show:

In other words, Noë thinks that Sur's intervention does not change the intrinsic structure of rewired ferret A1, but the intervention does change the intrinsic structure.

Extended Mind and Locked in Syndrome

I recently mentioned locked in Syndrome as a problem for Noë, but there is apparently another take on it discussed in this exchange:

Fenton & Alpert, "Extending Our View on Using BCIs for Locked-in Syndrome"

and

Walter, "Locked-in Syndrome, BCI, and a Confusion about Embodied, Embedded, Extended, and Enacted Cognition"

Extended Mind and Cognition at Academia.edu

Facebook for academics here?  They have some folks interested in extended mind/cognition.

Noë on Locked in Syndrome?

Consciousness is not something the brain achieves on its own.  Consciousness requires the joint operation of brain, body, and world.  (Noë, 2009, p. 10).

Noë notes that there are individuals who suffer from locked in syndrome.  (Noë, 2009, p. 17f).  They appear to be totally unconscious displaying no actions or behaviors commonly taken to be indicative of consciousness, but they are nonetheless conscious.  How is this possible on Noë’s view?  If consciousness requires the joint operation of brain, body, and world, then how can there be inactive individuals who are nonetheless conscious?

Noë on Perceiving the Alarm Clock?

"The world makes itself available to the perceiver through physical movement and interaction" (Noë, 2004, p. 1).

So, how is it that one perceives one's alarm clock going off in the morning when one is in deep sleep?  How is it that this happens through something like a blind person tap-tapping her way through a cluttered space?

Haugeland's Approach to Revolutionary EC

I noted that one reason to distinguish revolutionary and supplementary EC is that they bear different explanatory burdens.  So, recall one way that Haugeland argues for revolutionary EC.  He argues that the brain is not a component of the cognitive system, since there is no interface between the brain, body, and world.  So, this is revolutionary ...  rejecting intracranial cognition.

As an aside, one might think that, if your theory of what a system is tells you that the brain is not a component of the cognitive system, then you should check your theory of what a system is.  One person's modus ponens is another's modus tollens, after all.

Who Supports Revolutionary EC? 6

Alva Noë:

Meaningful thought arises only for the whole animal dynamically engaged with its environment, or so I contend. (Noë, 2009, p. 8)

Reply to Fisher Forthcoming

At the 2009 SSPP meeting, we had an "authors meet critics" session on Bounds featuring Justin Fisher, Larry Shapiro, Fred Adams, and myself.  Fisher's comments there were essentially his critical notice in The Journal of Mind and Behavior.  Having written up my comments for the SSPP event, it dawned on me that I might as well try to have them published.  So, The Journal of Mind and Behavior has accepted them.  The forthcoming manuscript is here.

I think Leslie Marsh has been spearheading the publication of papers on extended cognition at the JM&B. They also just published a Rob Rupert review of Andy Clark's Supersizing the Mind.

Who Supports Revolutionary EC? 5

Evan Thompson:

Our mental lives involve our body and the world beyond the surface membrane of our organism, and therefore cannot be reduced simply to brain processes inside the head. (Thompson, 2007, p. ix)

A Rupert Review of Clark's Supersizing

Published in the Journal of Mind and Behavior and described Here.

Abstract:

For well over two decades, Andy Clark has been gleaning theoretical lessons from the leading edge of cognitive science, applying a combination of empirical savvy and philosophical instinct that few can match. Clark’s most recent book, Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension, brilliantly expands his oeuvre. It offers a well-informed and focused survey of research in the burgeoning field of situated cognition, a field that emphasizes the contribution of environmental and non-neural bodily structures to the production of intelligent behavior. The situated research program, fledgling though it may be in some respects, has reached an age at which its philosophical stock can reasonably be taken; and Clark is just the person to take it.

Also, be on the look out for a future book symposium on Supersizing in Philosophical Studies.

Who Supports Revolutionary EC? 4

Mark Rowlands:

I shall argue that there is no theoretically respectable reason for separating the mind off from the world in the way the internalist picture tells us we should.  There is, in other words, no theoretically respectable reason for thinking of cognitive processes as purely and exclusively internal items.  And to say there is no theoretically respectable reason, here, simply means that there is no reason that can be derived from psychological theory as such.  The parsing of the realm of cognition into, on the one hand, cognitive processes that are conceived of as purely internal items and, on the other, external causes, stimuli, orcues of these internal items is not something that is demanded by our theorizing about the mind, but an optional extra.  It is a pre-theoretical picture we use to interpret our explicit theorizing, not something mandated by that theorizing.  It is, in short, a mythology. 
(Rowlands, 1992, pp. 12-13)

Enaction School 2010

Most folks reading this have probably heard of this elsewhere, but just in case:
Enaction School 2010.

Conference: The Embodied Mind: Perspectives and Limitations

For those interested in presenting a poster, there is plenty of time.
The Embodied Mind: Perspectives and Limitations

Who Supports Revolutionary EC? 3

Richard Menary

The alleged fallacy assumes something like the following picture: an external object/ process X is causally coupled to a cognitive agent Y. The Otto example fits this picture: a notebook coupled to a discrete cognitive agent, whereby the notebook becomes part of the memory system of that agent because it is coupled to the agent. Cognitive integrationists should resist this picture. It is a residual form of internalism, because it assumes a discrete, already formed, cognitive agent. And this is precisely the picture we are arguing against. If we accept the picture of a cognitive agent as implementing a discrete cognitive system, before they ever encounter an external vehicle, then we will have accepted the very picture of cognition we set out to reject.  (Menary, 2006, p. 333)

The manipulation of external vehicles is importantly different from the manipulation of internal vehicles and their integration is the unit of cognitive analysis. We are not just coupling artifacts to pre-existing cognitive agents; the organism becomes a cognitive agent by being coupled to the external environment. (Menary, 2006, p. 342) 

Who Supports Revolutionary EC? 2

Probably Susan Hurley:

Mycroft is a human being, not a machine.  But his brain was programmed by a Martian philosopher who abandoned him when she no longer had a use for him.  Most of his ‘thinking’ is done from his armchair.  On the other hand, Marlowe’s network was trained in part by a linguistic upbringing and education and is continuously tuned by his robust sensori-motor interactions with his environment,
…
Marlowe’s title to genuine thought is more secure than Mycroft’s, anchored precisely by his ongoing interactions with his environment.  If either, it is Mycroft who is the mere mimicker of thought, the appropriate object of zombie or marionette worries.
(Hurley, 1998, p. 4).

Who Supports Revolutionary EC? 1

Who supports the view that there is no intracranial cognition, only transcranial cognition?  Actually, a surprising number of folks.  Apparently, John Haugeland for one:

Intelligence, then, is nothing other than the overall interactive structure of meaningful behavior and objects. … Perhaps the basic idea can be brought out this way.  Intelligence is the ability to deal reliably with more than the present and the manifest.  (Haugeland, 1998, p. 230)

Who Supports Supplementary EC?

Who thinks that, in addition to the intracranial cognition that has been studied in the past, there is also transcranial cognition that is "just like" intracranial cognition?

Given the Inga-Otto example, Clark probably should count as a defender of Supplementary EC.  For Clark, the "just like" has to do with "sameness of functional poise", whatever that amounts to.

Mark Sprevak, in "Extended Cognition and Functionalism", also seems to support Supplementary EC.  For Sprevak, the "just like" has to do with some "general categories of cognition", whatever that amounts to.

Justin Fisher, in his critical notice of Bounds, also seems to support Supplementary EC.  For Fisher, like Sprevak, the "just like" has to do with some "general categories of cognition".

Supplementary EC

Supplementary EC proposes that, in addition to the intracranial cognition that has been studied in the past, there is also transcranial cognition that is "just like" intracranial cognition.  (The qualifier "just like"covers a multitude of issues.)

Another way of thinking about this kind of EC is that it adopts a "fractal scaling" approach. In fractal scaling, one has structures at one size scale that are mirrored at a larger scale.  So, think of Inga-Otto.  Inga has memories on the size scale of the brain; Otto has memories on the size scale of brain-body-world.

Two Types of EC: Supplementary and Revolutionary

Here is a distinction among types of EC that seems to be worth considering, if for no other reason than that they bring with them distinct argumentative burdens.

Supplementary EC proposes that, in addition to the intracranial cognition that has been studied in the past, there is also transcranial cognition that is "just like" intracranial cognition.  (The qualifier "just like"covers a multitude of issues.)

Revolutionary EC proposes that there is no intracranial cognition, only transcranial cognition.

New work on EC

Leslie Marsh draws attention to the further spread of EC:
http://manwithoutqualities.com/2010/04/11/the-network-extended-mind/

"Extended cognitive science is not a priori philosophy of mind"

So, say Chemero and Silberstein in "Defending Extended Cognition" (p. 128).

That seems to be something of an oversimplification.  There are those thought experiments in Clark & Chalmers, (1998), i.e., of Inga-Otto and the three modes of Tetris play.  Then, Clark (2005, 2008), has a thought experiment about Martians.  This thought experiment is also taken up by Menary, (2006).  And, Clark (2008, forthcoming) has a "Hippo-world" thought experiment.  Thought experiments seem like a priori philosophy of mind to me.

Chemero's Radical Embodied Cognitive Science is also an e-book

So, this is kind of cool: The MIT Press E-book.

Fred Adams was interested in an e-book version of Bounds.  Maybe next time around ...

Problems for Rowlands' MotC

1. Chatterbots seem to satisfy Rowlands' conditions but are not cognitive agents.
2. Pure look-up tables seems to satisfy Rowland's conditions, but are not cognitive agents.
3. CD players seem to satisfy Rowland's conditions, but are not cognitive agents.

So, it looks like Rowlands needs some additional restriction on what kinds of manipulations are performed on non-derived representations.  Of course, that would make his view even more similar to the Adams and Aizawa view.

Rowlands' MotC and Cognitive Science Practice

The idea underpinning the criterion is that if we want to understand what cognitive processes are, then we had better pay close attention to the sorts of things cognitive scientists regard as cognitive. That is not to say that we must restrict ourselves to the pronouncements or determinations of cognitive scientists, or that we should regard these as decisive, but merely that we had better be prepared to use these as our starting point. A significant part of the criterion I shall defend can be extracted from a careful examination of cognitive-scientific practice. When we examine such practice, I shall argue, what we find is an implicit mark of the cognitive ... (Rowlands, 2009, pp. 7-8).

Here we find an approach much like that in Adams and Aizawa, and similar in spirit to Chemero (who resists the idea of a MotC).

Rowlands buys non-derived content

I earlier mentioned how Mark Rowlands embraces a "mark of the cognitive approach" to adjudicated matters regarding extended cognition.  In fact, here is his account:

A process P is a cognitive process if and only if:
(1) P involves information processing—the manipulation and transformation of
information-bearing structures.
(2) This information processing has the proper function of making available either to the subject or to subsequent processing operations information that was
(or would have been) prior to (or without) this processing, unavailable.
(3) This information is made available by way of the production, in the subject
of P, of a representational state.
(4) P is a process that belongs to the subject of that representational state.  (Rowlands, 2009, p. 8)

Then, regarding (3) he writes,

I shall assume that the type of representational state invoked in (3) is one that
possesses non-derived content. Derived content is content, possessed by a given state, that derives from the content of other representational states of a cognizing subject or from the social conventions that constitute that agent’s linguistic milieu. Non-derived content is content that does not so derive. A form of content being nonderived is not equivalent to its being sui generis: non-derived content can, for example, derived from, and be explained in terms of, the history or informational carrying profile of the state that has it. It is what content is derived from that is crucial. Non-derived content is content that is not derived from other content – it is not content that is irreducible or sui generis.  (pp. 9-10).

So, where Adams and Aizawa have been non-committal regarding what theory of non-derived content to invoke, Rowlands take the plunge.

Abstract of my "Rupert's Extended Cognition" for SSPP 2010

Rupert’s Extended Cognition
Abstract

Rob Rupert is widely recognized to be one of most significant critics of the hypothesis that, under certain conditions, cognitive processes extend from within the brain into the body and environment.  According to Rupert, this hypothesis of extended cognition runs afoul of what he takes to be cognitive science’s fundamental explanatory construct, namely, “the persisting set of integrated capacities that contribute, distinctively and nontrivially, to the production of cognitive phenomena” (Rupert, 2009, p. 41).  This is Rupert’s positive theory of what cognitive science is about. This paper argues that Rupert’s theory has three problems:
     1. It endorses an objectionable form of operationalism,
     2. It offers too weak a theory of cognitive processes and capacities, and
     3. It offers too strong a theory of cognitive processes and capacities.

Refinining "We need a MotC" 3

So, here is a more careful take on the idea that we need a MotC.  It is common ground between EC and its critics that there are causal processes that pass through the brain, body, and world.  So, to resolve this debate, what we apparently need is some way of typing these causal processes.  So, on the Machery strategy of individuating cognitive processes by appeal to visual processes, we have this.  (Provided we have a way of identifying visual processes.)  Further, on the Allen, Grau, and Meagher strategy of individuating cognitive processes by appeal to Classical conditioning we have this.  So, the more careful state of the idea that we need a MotC is that we need a way to type the processes that are under debate.  Saying that we need a MotC seems to be a minor simplification of this.  Right?  Wrong?

Mark Rowlands' "Extended Cognition and the Mark of the Cognitive"

I earlier mentioned how Mike Wheeler embraces what I would call a "mark of the cognitive approach" to adjudicated matters regarding extended cognition.

But, Mark Rowlands has also embraced a lot of the approach as well.

Gotta like it.  There are at least some points where the advocates and critics of EC are not talking past each other.

HEFC and HESC are only prima facie different

Maybe that's right.  (In correspondence, Clark suggests something like this.)  And maybe the difference between HESC and HEAMC is only apparent.

A cognitive system is a system whose organization defines a domain of interactions in which it can act with relevance to the maintenance of itself, and the process of cognition is the actual (inductive) acting or behaving in this domain.  Living systems are cognitive systems, and living as a process is a process of cognition.  This statement is valid for all organisms, with and without a nervous system. 
(Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 13).

Chemero on cognition

I take it that cognition is the ongoing, active maintenance of a robust animal-environment system, achieved by closely co-ordinated perception and action.  Radical Embodied Cognitive Science, p. 212.

these brief remarks are not intended to supply a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, or criteria for what Adams and Aizawa call the "mark of the cognitive". (ibid.)

Much of my commentary on this footnote from Chemero addresses what appears to me to be methodological misdirections.  For example, in an earlier post, I noted that A&A don't take it that providing a mark of the cognitive is providing a definition.

But, note now that there seems to be a fine line between giving the account that Chemero gives and actually giving a set of necessary and sufficient conditions.  So, for example, on Chemero's account, it looks as though cognition must involve an animal.  It's a necessary condition on a cognitive process that it involve an animal.  It also looks to be necessary that cognition involves perception and action.

Moreover, on Chemero's account, the ongoing, active maintenance of a robust animal-environment system, achieved by closely co-ordinated perception and action would appear to be sufficient for cognition.

Now, maybe there is a sense in which Chemero's account does not amount to giving necessary and sufficient conditions.  Maybe Chemero can get off this hook.  But, then why can't Adams and Aizawa get off the hook in the same way?

Refining "We need a MotC" 2

Here's another way that "We need a MotC" is a bit too strong.  Allen, Grau, and Meagher (2009) argue that processes of classical conditioning are realized in the spinal cord.  On the assumption that classical conditioning is a type of cognitive process, they are able to give a plausible argument for cognition outside of the brain without a MotC.

Adams and Aizawa are ok with cognition in the spinal cord.  (Cf. Bounds, p. 18).

Both this case and Machery's "MotV" case apparently dodge the need for a MotC by way of appeal to more restrictive cases.

Still, these seem to be rather technical refinements.

Refining "We need a MotC" 1

Edouard Machery pointed out to me a sense in which "We need a MotC" is too strong.

Suppose you have a "mark of the visual", i.e. an account of the difference between a visual process and a non-visual process.  Then, if visual processes are cognitive processes and you have visual processes that extend, then you have a good case for extended cognition without a MotC. (Of course, one still has some work to do to show that visual processes extend ...)

So, a "technical" refinement of the idea seems to me to be in order.

Correction to: "Cognitive processes involve representations with non-derived content"

Adams and Aizawa often write that what distinguishes cognitive processes from non-cognitive processes is that the former involve representations with non-derived content.

But as Clark points out somewhere (help wanted on this ref), this is probably too loose.  When Otto uses his notebook, there are presumably mental representations in his brain that have non-derived content, so that his use of the notebook in some sense involves representations with non-derived content

Yet, an appropriate clarification of the target concept is ready to hand in terms of the idea of a vehicle of content.  (For its use in the context of the extended cognition debates, see, e.g., (Hurley, 1998).)  The idea is that cognitive vehicles of content must bear non-derived content, so that the vehicles of content in cognitive processes must bear non-derived content.  That seems to work to rule out Otto's use of his notebook involving representations in the relevant sense.