Rowlands' MotC and Cognitive Science Practice

The idea underpinning the criterion is that if we want to understand what cognitive processes are, then we had better pay close attention to the sorts of things cognitive scientists regard as cognitive. That is not to say that we must restrict ourselves to the pronouncements or determinations of cognitive scientists, or that we should regard these as decisive, but merely that we had better be prepared to use these as our starting point. A significant part of the criterion I shall defend can be extracted from a careful examination of cognitive-scientific practice. When we examine such practice, I shall argue, what we find is an implicit mark of the cognitive ... (Rowlands, 2009, pp. 7-8).

Here we find an approach much like that in Adams and Aizawa, and similar in spirit to Chemero (who resists the idea of a MotC).

I take it that cognition is the ongoing active maintenance of a robust animal-environment system, achieved by closely co-ordinated perception and action.  This understanding of the nature of cognition is intended to reflect claims by radical embodied cognitive scientists in philosophy, psychology, AI, and artificial life (Chemero, 2009, p. 212.