Refining "We need a MotC" 2

Here's another way that "We need a MotC" is a bit too strong.  Allen, Grau, and Meagher (2009) argue that processes of classical conditioning are realized in the spinal cord.  On the assumption that classical conditioning is a type of cognitive process, they are able to give a plausible argument for cognition outside of the brain without a MotC.

Adams and Aizawa are ok with cognition in the spinal cord.  (Cf. Bounds, p. 18).

Both this case and Machery's "MotV" case apparently dodge the need for a MotC by way of appeal to more restrictive cases.

Still, these seem to be rather technical refinements.

Allen, C., Grau, J.W., and Meagher, M.W. (2009) The Lower Bounds of Cognition: What Do Spinal Cords Reveal? In John Bickle (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Neuroscience. Oxford University Press, 129-142.