I take it that cognition is the ongoing, active maintenance of a robust animal-environment system, achieved by closely co-ordinated perception and action. Radical Embodied Cognitive Science, p. 212.
these brief remarks are not intended to supply a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, or criteria for what Adams and Aizawa call the "mark of the cognitive". (ibid.)Much of my commentary on this footnote from Chemero addresses what appears to me to be methodological misdirections. For example, in an earlier post, I noted that A&A don't take it that providing a mark of the cognitive is providing a definition.
But, note now that there seems to be a fine line between giving the account that Chemero gives and actually giving a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. So, for example, on Chemero's account, it looks as though cognition must involve an animal. It's a necessary condition on a cognitive process that it involve an animal. It also looks to be necessary that cognition involves perception and action.
Moreover, on Chemero's account, the ongoing, active maintenance of a robust animal-environment system, achieved by closely co-ordinated perception and action would appear to be sufficient for cognition.
Now, maybe there is a sense in which Chemero's account does not amount to giving necessary and sufficient conditions. Maybe Chemero can get off this hook. But, then why can't Adams and Aizawa get off the hook in the same way?