Now, if the theory of physics cannot be claimed to have monopoly on descriptions of "what is really there" , there is no longer any reason to assume that the perceptual systems must necessarily begin by registering what is basic to physics. On the contrary, we should expect perceptual mechanisms which directly register variables of high informational value to the perceiver. (Runeson, 1977, p. 173).Why should we expect perceptual mechanisms that directly register variables of high informational value to the perceiver? I'm not sure exactly what "variables of high informational value" are, but maybe they are like affordances, such as something like an apple. Maybe the reason that we do not directly register affordances is that evolutionary constraints have made this impossible. (This is a theme I've mentioned before.) The early visual system (think back to fish) might have been constrained to detect light. So, the best that we can do today is detect things like apples by detecting the light that they reflect. We can detect apples and other fruits in trees by detecting their color. The shift from the rejection of reductionism to physics to the adoption of directly registering variable of high informational value to the perceiver seems to me hasty.
Runeson, S. (2008). "On the possibility of "smart" perceptual mechanisms". Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, Volume 18, Issue 1, pages 172–179, September 1977