These are thorny issues indeed, [This is not to say that they can’t be handled satisfactorily. Quite convincing [extended cognition] (counter)arguments are e.g., Clark (2007), Menary (2006) and Rowlands (2009).]Just for the record, there are further replies to these, including some in The Bounds of Cognition, Aizawa, (2010), and Adams and Aizawa (forthcoming).
In truth, I don't see that Vaesen needs to have our critique rebutted in order to have his project go forward. He doesn't endorse a kind of extended cognition that A&A challenge. So, to put matters as I see them, even though there is essentially no extended scientific cognition out there, this is not a problem for Vaesen.
Adams, F. and Aizawa, K. (forthcoming). The Value of Cognitivism in Thinking about Extended Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
Aizawa, K. (2010). The Coupling-Constitution Fallacy Revisited, Cognitive Systems Research, 11, (4), 332-342.
Clark, A. (2007). Mementos revenge: The extended mind, extended. In R. Menary (Ed.), The extended mind. Aldershot: Ashgate
[N.B. This was actually published by MIT Press in 2010.]Menary, R. (2006). Attacking the bounds of cognition. Philosophical Psychology, 19(3), 329–344.
Rowlands, M. (2009). Extended cognition and the mark of the cognitive. Philosophical Psychology, 22(1), 1–19.
Vaesen, K. (2010) "Knowledge without credit, exhibit 4: extended cognition" Synthese
online. DOI 10.1007/s11229-010-9744-0