In the niche of the shark 'an edible thing' and 'electric field of, say, type F' are nomically related. To predicate of the shark (a) 'detects electric field of type F' and (b) 'takes to be an edible thing' is not to refer to two different states of affairs, one (viz. (b)) that is reached from the other (viz. (a)) by an inference. Rather, it is to make reference in two ways to a single state of affairs of the shark-niche system. The linking of (a) and (b) is not something that goes on in the "mind" of the shark, as the Establishment would have it. The linking of (a) and (b) is in the physics of an ecological world, namely, that system given by the complementation of the shark and its niche.Fifth, it seems to me that the TSRM strategy is misguided. The cornerstone of their reply to the shark case is that if P and Q are nomologically related under normal conditions, then detecting P and taking to be Q are the same. But, the strategy seems to me to be misguided. In general, one does not want the detection of P to identified with taking to be whatever P is nomologically connected to. So, there is a nomological connection between being a triangle and being a trilateral, but does one want to say that detecting a triangle is the same as taking something to be a trilateral? There is a nomological connection between being a tuna and having mass, but does one want to say that detecting a tuna is the same as taking something to have mass?
There is probably some implicit condition that P is uniquely nomologically connected to Q or that Q is the only thing in the natural environment that is nomologically correlated with P. So, on how about P = "detects sunlight" and Q = "takes there to a thermonuclear reaction taking place about 93,000,000 miles away"? How about P = "smells blood in the water" and Q = "takes there to be alpha hemoglobin present"?