I have repeatedly stated my position that cognitive integration starts from the following positions:So, as I read these claims, I don't see HEC on the list. I don't see anything like the claim that cognitive processes are realized by (or supervene on) brain, body, and world. But, maybe that's just my shortsightedness. Doesn't Menary believe that cognitive processes are realized by or supervene on brain, body, and world?
Consequently, I propose that I am not committed to the view that cognition is first in the head and then gets extended into tools. Nor does it follow that I am committed to the idea that pencils can think for themselves. (Menary, 2010)
- That we are actively embodied in a socially constructed cognitive niche and
- That phylogenetically and ontogenetically there is good evidence to suppose that we acquire cognitive capacities to create, maintain and manipulate the shared cognitive niche and
- That this has led to the development of hybrid cognitive systems where the bodily manipulation of vehicles (some of them representational) in the niche involves the coordination of neural, bodily and environmental vehicles.
- Cognitive processing sometimes involves these online bodily manipulations of the cognitive niche, but also collaborative thinking and offline private thinking.
Or, maybe there's an argument that links these theses to HEC. If so, what is it?