What is a mental or cognitive representation? There is no philosophically orYes, it is unfortunate that there is no consensus on what makes something a cognitive representation. But, this is philosophy. It's typical for there to be no consensus on what makes anything anything. I surfed over to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and found that there is no consensus on what death is!
empirically agreed upon account of what makes something a cognitive representation. This is quite a stunning fact. Imagine genetics without a model of genes, this is the position in which cognitivism finds itself. Adams and Aizawa are not alone in having no criteria for determining when something is to be counted as a representation (oh the irony!) This brings us to the second leg of the grail quest, a theory of content. Adams and Aizawa make much play of a purported naturalistic theory of content for cognitive representations. However, they have no convincing theory available to them, and this explains why they do not attempt to explain how cognitive representations get their contents. This is also quite stunning. (Menary, 2010)
So, I don't put that much stock in "lack of consensus" arguments, but if Menary does, maybe he should chew on the fact that there is a lack of consensus in the EC literature regarding the conditions under which cognition extends. Many of the options are discussed in Chapters 5-9 in The Bounds of Cognition.