So Adams and Aizawa first treat extended cognition as a ‘revolutionary’ thesis which denies intracranial cognition, and then suggest that complementarity fails to deliver on the revolutionary promise. They are thus seeking to trap the extended cognition theorist in a dilemma: either maintain the extreme ‘revolutionary’ position, or collapse back into individualism. But we reject the alleged dilemma. Along with Clark and the others, we inhabit a rich middle ground, one which this paper continues to develop, which is entirely distinct both from internalist forms of cognitivism and from externalist anti-cognitivism. Yet when Adams and Aizawa do accurately acknowledge that our views are not anti-cognitivist, they try to assimilate us to a more conservative internalism. (Sutton, et al.)A&A don't offer this dilemma. That dilemma is of Sutton, et al.'s, making. The A&A view is easy. Complementarity does not support the rejection of intracranial cognition. That's now common ground between A&A and Sutton, et al. Second, complementarity does not offer an argument for HEC. A&A argued for this, and Sutton, et al., apparently don't want to fight over HEC versus HEMC. This whole middle ground that they want to explore is what we conceded they should explore ... just don't take it to be HEC or to undermine intracranial cognition.
To me, again the upshot is that, apparent misunderstandings aside, the rich middle ground is a fine topic to study.