While these exchanges are often insightful, they fail to accomplish any clear consensus or advance the discussion very far. The debate would have benefitted from some prior agreement on what counts as getting it right -- on, say, how we might discern the difference between a cognitive system's parts and non-parts. Without this, the two sides often talk past each other.I think that there probably is some more work that should be done here, but Rupert talks about this in his book, Haugeland discusses this in his "Mind Embodied and Embedded", Weiskopf discusses this in his Cognitive Systems Research paper, and there are probably others I'm forgetting.
P.S., for some reason I know not what, my post mentioning Weiskopf's paper is--by a wide margin--the most popular post of all time here.
P.P.S., another "lack of consensus" problem for Menary.